Dealing with dictatorship: The US and Hungary during the early kádár years by Borhi, László
DEALING WITH DICTATORSHIP:
THE US AND HUNGARY
DURING THE EARLY KÁDÁR YEARS
LÁSZLÓ BORHI
Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary
E-mail: lborhi@indiana.edu
Because of the legacy of 1956 the hardest country to engage behind the iron curtain
was Hungary. The history of the Hungarian political amnesty, a milestone in the de-
velopment of the most liberal system in the Soviet bloc is an anatomy of the hurdles
of diplomacy in dealing with a closed dictatorship under the sway of a foreign
power. The new Soviet-installed government launched massive reprisals against
real and alleged participants of the revolution. For the first time the US was able to
influence events in a Soviet controlled country through diplomatic efforts exerted in
the UN. In 1962 after years of difficult negotiation the leaders in Budapest agreed to
amnesty political prisoners in exchange for the removal of the Hungarian Question.
The settlement was in the best interest of the Hungarians. The regime’s international
position was an embarrassment for Moscow. Hungary was internationally isolated.
That the deal was so long in the making showed the difficulty of dealing with a client
state supported by a world power. The political committee’s view of world matters
was formed by the tenets of communist ideology. This and the knowledge that they
would be backed by the Soviet Union through thick and thin allowed the Hungarians
to adopt a rigid and uncompromising stance. They exploited domestic weakness to
garner support in a conflict that Moscow was ready to settle. Kádár expected Ameri-
can officials to deal with Hungary as a proud independent national entity. Commu-
nist functionaries struggled to understand the motivations of American policy.
American diplomats found it hard to strike the right tone when dealing with their
communist counterparts. Also they did not know about the inner power struggle be-
hind the facade of communist unity. The Kádár regime’s eventual willingness to
strike a deal and put an end to domestic terror had to do with his desire to launch the
country on a road to economic modernization. This required a gradual and limited
opening to the West. One of the pillars of this new policy would be the normaliza-
tion of relations with the US. Prudently the State Department made it known that
this would not happen until political prisoners were freed.
In the meantime US goals in Eastern Europe went through drastic change. This
was matched by a new approach to the Soviet bloc. The liberation of Eastern Europe
and the reunification of the continent were deemed unfeasible. Therefore a more
moderate aim of “continental re-association” was adopted. In fact the restoration of
the independence of states in Eastern Europe no longer seemed an unequivocally
more preferable condition than the Soviet control of middle Europe. Rather than
destabilizing them as in the fifties the US became interested in the consolidation of
more liberal communist regimes as a prerequisite of western security. In other
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words as opposed to the doctrine of the 50s western security no longer required the
restoration of national independence. Liberation and containment was replaced by
the doctrine of bridge building. This aimed at the gradual transformation of commu-
nist regimes to more liberal and more autonomous albeit not independent or fully
democratic entities within the tolerance limit of the Soviets. By the early seventies
the European status quo was “not so bad” for the Americans. The East Europeans’
only hope for liberation would be change within the Soviet Union.
Keywords: 1956, reprisals, UN, Hungarian Question, Hungarian mandate,
amnesty, liberation, containment, bridge building, reassociation, autonomy,
national independence, western security
Democratic powers have always faced recalcitrant rogue states, and often pre-
sumed that the right set of policy pressures could force these contrarian nations to
comply with civilized codes of conduct, domestically and internationally. It is of-
ten forgotten that even such states have domestic, bureaucratic struggles – dis-
agreements between agencies and decision-makers with divergent agendas. Such
states are often nationally self-conscious entities that demand respect from the in-
ternational community, and thus whose actions are conditioned by foreign pres-
sures and unforeseen events. Accordingly, there is no single, “correct” policy for
any regime. Transformations require patience, flexibility, and the quickness to
adapt to changing circumstances. When to give in and when to tighten the reigns,
how much to expect in a given situation, how to sound out the vulnerabilities of
the opponent, and how to avoid to blackmail: problems and dilemmas like these
are rarely recognized as factors in international affairs.
The United Nations had been conceived as a supranational organization that
would transcend narrow national interests to uphold international harmony.
Instead, it became a forum in which the interests of the two superpowers and the
blocs they represented were to collide. The UN was incapable of stopping Soviet
aggression in Hungary, but, perhaps surprisingly, it became an efficient tool with
which to exert pressure on the Kádár regime to bring its bloody rampage of
terroristic reprisals to an end.
Shortly after Marshall Konev launched the final assault on Budapest, the UN
decided to suspend its decision on the Hungarian mandate in the world organiza-
tion. Subsequently, on January 10th 1957, the General Assembly formed a
fact-finding committee to explore the Hungarian situation in the hope of sending a
UN mission to Budapest. A separate proposal, to reject the Hungarian mandate
(which would have meant the country’s ejection from the world organization),
was not accepted due to fears it could serve as a precedent for excluding Taiwan,
which the USSR had refused to accept as the legitimate representative of main-
land China. Nevertheless, domestic opponents accused the Eisenhower adminis-
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tration of a double standard, of doing less against the aggressor in Eastern Europe
than the ones (Israel, France, and Great Britain) in the Middle East.
Even so, the taking up of the Hungarian question and the suspension of the
Hungarian mandate isolated the Kádár regime. In the international arena, Kádár’s
government was forced to concentrate on resolving the Hungarian question,
restoring its full status in the UN, and breaking out of its status as an international
pariah. This was not a new predicament for Hungarian foreign policy: the country
had experienced similar situations in the aftermath of both World Wars. For the
United States, the question was whether the Hungarian government was willing to
take concrete steps toward a domestic détente. To maximize the pressure,
Washington questioned the Soviet-installed regime’s legitimacy. In addition to
the impasse in the UN, Hungarian–American relations were also complicated by a
number of other, interrelated issues, which meant that US contacts with Hungary
took place at a lower diplomatic level than its relations with other people’s
democracies. One such issue was the seemingly intractable problem of Cardinal
Mindszenty. Until the problem of his presence in the US embassy in Budapest was
resolved, talks on the settlement of financial claims could not even begin. Such
efforts were already under way with Romania. Moreover, diplomatic contacts
were stuck on the legation level. The new minister, Edward Wailes, had arrived at
his post as Soviet tanks were rolling into the Hungarian plain. He had had no time
to present his credentials to the Nagy government before it was overthrown, and
did not do so afterward. When the UN General Assembly acted on a US proposal
to suspend Hungary’s mandate, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry asked Wailes to
present his credentials or leave the country. Wailes opted for the latter and
departed within four days. Nobody suspected that a decade would pass before his
successor was appointed. Thus bilateral relations had again reached a nadir.
Almost all contact ceased, even at the grass-roots level. Diplomats avoided each
other in the corridors of the United Nations; “contacts” were restricted to the
mutual expulsion of military attachés; the Hungarian chargé was not received at
the State Department for months. Political pressures drove the business
community to boycott Hungary, which led Paprikás Weiss, a popular delicacy
store in New York, to seek State Department approval to import Hungarian
salami. American passports were invalid for Hungary, thus almost no one
embarked on the trip across the ocean.
In their own way, the Hungarians also created tensions, sometimes seemingly
ready to take things to the breaking point. In reality, Budapest would stop at the
edge of the precipice, just short of breaking off relations. In May 1957, at the insti-
gation of the Ministry of Interior and the counter-intelligence service, the Hungar-
ian Foreign Ministry demanded that the US Legation reduce its staff of diplomats
and administrative personnel.1 The pretext was that “the American employees are
illegally collecting intelligence instead of nurturing relations”.2 The Hungarians
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then offered to exchange ministers,3 but to nobody’s surprise this offer was re-
jected. Dulles would allow minor gestures only to support steps towards the relax-
ation of tensions and to nurture the peoples’ spirit of resistance. This included the
relaxation of travel restrictions and a token expansion of cultural exchanges.4 The
chargé in Budapest opposed the exchange of heads of mission on the grounds that
it would entail the acceptance of the Hungarian mandate and the easing of eco-
nomic controls; at the same time, he saw no chance for UN resolutions to be im-
plemented in Hungary.5 Austria’s foreign minister, the future chancellor Bruno
Kreisky, who would eventually build a special “K und K” relationship with
Kádár, offered to mediate negotiations with the regime in Budapest. When
Kreisky asked what conditions they would have to fulfill for the sake of normal-
ization, he was told that the Hungarians needed to comply with UN resolutions,
admit UN representatives to the country, grant safe passage to Mindszenty, and
make peace with the Hungarian people – conditions the chargé in Hungary con-
sidered exaggerated.6 By the end of 1957, tensions subsided somewhat when it
became apparent that the regime in Hungary would last.
Kádár managed to eliminate the Central Workers’ Council, his main rival for
the hearts and minds of the working class. Meanwhile, his Stalinist foe Rákosi was
kept in Moscow, and the chief ideologist of Hungarian Stalinism, József Révai,
was neutralized. Most importantly, Kádár won Khrushchev’s firm support.7 The
head of the State Department’s Bureau of East European Affairs pointed out that
the regime in Budapest was on its way toward domestic and international
consolidation. Internationally, the Revolution was fading into oblivion, and it was
doubtful whether international pressure could do anything to liberalize the
system. He therefore recommended a more flexible course, one more readily
adaptable to existing conditions.8 On the first anniversary of the Revolution,
Eisenhower made clear that no one in the higher echelons of power had
contemplated any radical changes in US policy. In response to the president’s
address, Hungarian Foreign Ministry officials recommended that diplomatic
relations with the US be severed, but Kádár rejected such a drastic measure.
Instead, a harshly worded note was drafted calling on US leaders to refrain from
supporting “counter-revolutionary elements”. However, the Soviets prevented
the message from being sent.9 Moscow exercised restraint, an approach
Washington did not expect.
Another push towards normalization came from a rather unexpected quarter.
The Hungarian chargé in Washington, Tibor Zádor, a relatively junior diplomat
who had distinguished himself in his proclamations of support for Kádár, now
advocated “steps towards normalization of relations” with the United States in
order to “reduce the intensity of the hostile campaign and improve relations with
other Western states”. He recommended the release of the Hungarian employees
of the US Legation, and a “revision” to the quantitative controls on American
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personnel. This diplomat was also in favor of further steps, including an exchange
of statements by high-level functionaries; he primarily recommended diplomatic
channels and the use of the legation in Washington in pursuing a policy of
normalization.10 On his own initiative, Zádor met Senator Malone with the
intention of expanding trade relations.11 Zádor used the modest means at his
disposal to break out of his isolation, although some of his efforts may have done
more harm than good. These included film screenings at the legation. One of his
movies was meant to show that “the situation is quite normal and the traces of the
counter-revolution were disappearing”, but since such a film “obviously” did “not
exist”, the legation staff pieced one together from some older footage and
borrowed a screen from the Romanians. This short film was named “Hungary
1957”, but the Hungarian desk officer at the State Department had justifiable
doubts about its authenticity. It was also subject to question whether an audience
of American businessmen, lawyers, and diplomats would appreciate scenes like
“Workers’ Meetings in Budapest”, “The Formation of the Workers’ Militia”, “Ho
Chi Minh’s Visit”, and the like. “Unforgettable April”, a film about the visit of
“the Soviet Party and Government Delegation” to Budapest, screened on a
different occasion, was probably equally successful.12
In 1958, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, which had showed at least some
interest in improving relations with the US, perceived a positive shift in the
American attitude toward Hungary, which they hoped to exploit. For the sake of
improvements, they made a list of possible measures taking into account mutual
grievances. On the Hungarian side these included the closing of the consulates in
1951, the “propaganda campaign” against the Hungarian government including
Radio Free Europe, and the lack of economic contacts. The foreign ministry
recommended that the Hungarian government make known that it would be
receptive to an overture and simultaneously release the US Legation’s imprisoned
employees.13 The Hungarian security apparatus won this round of the contest: as
soon as the employees in question were released, they were immediately relocated
to the countryside. At that point the Foreign Ministry was under the close
direction of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party’s Department of International
Relations, so there is no doubt that its recommendations represented the ideas of at
least some top leaders.
The international climate favored improvements. Khrushchev launched a
peace offensive, and although he made it clear that he would not negotiate on
Eastern Europe, he pulled Soviet troops out of Romania and at least one division
out of Hungary. Romania made good use of this window of opportunity. Party
leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej invited Americans to observe Romanian
elections and in 1958, his government announced that it would purchase 100
million dollars’ worth of industrial equipment from the US. The National Security
Council noted that Romania was prepared to expand its commercial ties and to
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arrange limited cultural, scientific, and technical exchange programs. In 1960, the
Battle Act was modified to allow the president to extend economic aid to
communist countries if it could be justified by national security, and in March of
that year, Romania concluded an agreement to settle outstanding financial claims
with the US. An exchange of notes would launch exchange programs between the
two countries in 1962, by which time Washington was no longer treating Romania
like the “most Sovietized” satellite.14
On January 25th, 1958, the Political Committee of the HSWP discussed the
normalization of Hungarian–American relations and the settling of the Hungarian
question at the UN. Foreign Minister Sík gave a speech in Parliament on April 2nd
in which he announced that he would take an initiative to repair ties with the US.
On May 8th, he told the American chargé, Garret Ackerson, that he had been think-
ing of exchanging ministers, but that the initiative had been cancelled. Ackerson
knew Hungary well. He had worked at the US Legation in the 1930s and had com-
pared the current state of Hungarian affairs unfavorably with the country he had
known under Horthy. Sík had studied in Moscow in the 1930s and lived through
the Great Terror, which left an indelible imprint on his psyche. His memoir, pub-
lished in the 1970s, recounts that while he was third secretary in the Hungarian le-
gation in Washington, he made a trip to New York during which the police
stopped his car in Central Park after dark. Sík was terrified of the American au-
thorities, convinced that he would disappear and lose his life. Now, the foreign
minister was claiming that his initiative had been rescinded because the Hungar-
ian mandate had been rejected during the Maritime Law Conference in Geneva
and because the US representative to the UN, James Wadsworth, had demanded
information on the whereabouts of the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution.
Ackerson pointed out that both events had occurred after Sík had announced his
diplomatic initiative.15 Its cancellation was all the more surprising since Sík had
informed Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko of his proposed action on
April 7th, and Gromyko had approved it.16
US diplomats suspected that Khrushchev might have been behind the
cancellation of the initiative, but in light of the foregoing, this seems unlikely. The
minutes of the Khrushchev–Kádár talks contain no reference to it. In his
conversation with Ackerson, Sík hinted that the Foreign Ministry had had nothing
to do with the relocation of the legation’s employees, and the fact that Sík needed
Béla Biszku’s permission to relax travel restrictions suggests that the Ministry of
the Interior may have intervened. Sík made reference to this via metacom-
munication: Ackerson recorded that during their conversation, Sík nodded
towards the Interior Ministry building on the opposite bank of the Danube. This
would indicate that the process of formulating foreign policy was more
complicated than the Americans suspected. The Soviets did not interfere in
relatively minor matters; the two rival ministries were simply pursuing the same
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goal by different means. In the 1950s, the Ministry of the Interior would win
battles like this even though the foreign minister was part of the old guard that had
returned from Moscow.
The Foreign Ministry suspected that the State Department no longer consid-
ered it just to “punish the Hungarians for the Soviet intervention” and to continue
rejecting overtures.17 If this idea had any real basis, it would be soon dispelled.
The execution of Imre Nagy and his associates on June 16th, 1958 put an end to the
lukewarm and sluggish process of improvement. These executions outraged the
administration and US diplomats made it clear that relations would turn for the
worse. This also meant that the Hungarian question would be kept in the limelight
at the UN. On July 11th, State Department officials consulted with their British
and French ambassadors on the rejection of the Hungarian mandate and possibly
even the rupture of diplomatic relations with Budapest.18 The drastic step was not
ultimately taken, but the latest American offensive at the UN caused a great head-
ache in Hungary. The Political Committee prepared an offensive of its own: they
wanted simultaneously to “unmask” American espionage and to show that Nagy’s
execution was the outcome of legal procedures against the participants of the 1956
revolt. In this debate, Prime Minister Ferenc Münnich called the American Lega-
tion a “spy center” and declared they could “go home if they want”. The eminence
grise of Hungarian foreign policy, a party historian named Dezsõ Nemes, did not
think it “useful” to sever diplomatic relations.19 The anti-American campaign
would include two more steps. There would be a government press conference on
September 12th to denouncing American espionage against Hungary. Then Buda-
pest would present a diplomatic note offering to participate in a dialogue if the US
“ceased hostile propaganda and spying against the country”.20 Hungarian leaders
were trying to legitimize their terror campaign by alleging threats from a danger-
ous foreign enemy. The Foreign Ministry’s unveiling of an American “spy cen-
ter” in front of a large audience invoked the atmosphere of the show trials, though
now the “defendant” was a foreign state.
The State Department was in no hurry to reply. Six months passed before the
Hungarians were told that normalization would occur if they were to adhere to
their commitments to the UN and to the terms of the peace treaty.21 In the
meantime, US diplomacy was working feverishly to reject the Hungarian
mandate, even though China’s membership in the organization would require a
two-thirds majority. In this critical situation, the foreign minister initiated the
second part of his “diplomatic offensive”, announcing to the General Assembly
that judicial proceedings against “counterrevolutionaries” had been closed and
terminated. US ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. immediately
declared that to his knowledge, four other leaders of the uprising had just been
convicted.22 The “offensive” was thus defeated and the Hungarian question was
inscribed on the agenda of the 13th General Assembly. By rejecting the
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Hungarians’ mandate, the State Department wanted to draw world attention to
communist reprisals there and thereby to deal a psychological defeat on the Soviet
Union.23 Eisenhower did not want to proceed all the way to a rejection of
Hungary’s membership, so the original situation remained: the Hungarian man-
date was merely suspended. The General Assembly did condemn the Hungarians
for executions (although the Americans erroneously held the Soviets
responsible), and asked Leslie Munro to report on the implementation of the UN
resolutions on Hungary.
As if this were not enough, another time bomb exploded, fraying the US–Hun-
garian relationship. Cardinal Mindszenty, the archbishop of Esztergom and pri-
mate of the Hungarian Catholic Church, had been held under house arrest until a
Hungarian army unit – the head of which was later executed for this act – briefly
liberated him in 1956 and brought him to Budapest to deliver a radio message.
Sensing that he was running out of luck, he appeared at the entrance of the US Le-
gation in the small hours of November 4th, just as the Soviet offensive on Buda-
pest was beginning. He was admitted, and, after consultations with Washington,
given asylum, even though legation personnel feared that doing so might cause
the premises to be attacked. Béla Kovács, whose arrest in 1947 became a symbol
of the Soviets’ ill-will behind the Iron Curtain, also appealed for refugee status,
but was denied. Kovács spent a number of years in Soviet captivity before serving
in Imre Nagy’s revolutionary government. The Hungarians understood that it was
against international law and US government regulations to use diplomatic mis-
sions for asylum, but Mindszenty’s presence at the US mission eventually pro-
vided unforseen opportunities to influence Hungarian politics, the likes of which
did not exist in any other Iron-Curtain state.
Initially, there were only difficulties. Legation employees prepared for an
assault on the building by the Hungarian police they expected them to try to
abduct the cardinal. In order to minimize risks, he was barred from all
correspondence other than discussions of his personal life. Nevertheless, the aged
prelate would bombard senior US officials and even presidents with letters. He
criticized their foreign policy. He thought it too conciliatory toward the Soviets,
too accepting of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and unprincipled in its
compromises with communism, a system he detested passionately. He was rarely
answered. His views were taken into account in the controversy over the return of
Saint Stephen’s Holy Crown. Mindszenty also caused problems for the
communist authorities. He was regarded as a political criminal, but charging him
seemed undesirable because of the public outcry it would likely cause. Both sides
took the most convenient course: they kept silent about it for as long as possible.
But Mindszenty’s fate was to become interlocked with Cold War politics.
The day of reckoning arrived with the death of Pius XII on October 9th, 1958.
That afternoon, the US Embassy in Rome recommended that the State Depart-
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ment ask the Sacred College of Cardinals to summon Mindszenty to the papal
election. Even though the State Department did not like the idea, the Embassy
took the necessary steps without waiting for an answer.24 The Vatican saw a
chance to get Mindszenty out, so the State Department instructed the American le-
gation in Budapest to negotiate with the Hungarian government on behalf of the
Sacred College of Cardinals. After the Vatican sent the appropriate instructions to
Mindszenty, officials in Washington decided that if the Hungarians were to allow
the cardinal to leave the country, they would guarantee Mindszenty’s silence on
political matters. A decade and a half later, the Hun- garian government would re-
lease Mindszenty on this same condition, but the time was not yet ripe in 1958.
Leaders in Budapest so hoped to extract political concessions that it took them
a long time to realize that there was no chance for any. Mindszenty himself was
fairly unenthusiastic about the prospect of leaving his refuge and agreed to go
only after lengthy persuasion. The American note to the Hungarian authorities
inexplicably failed to mention the conditions of his silence; it was restricted to the
question of whether the authorities would be willing to let Mindszenty travel to
the conclave in Rome.25 The reply was firmly negative. The Hungarians were not
even willing to explore the possibility at that point. They pointed out that their
authorities had condemned the cardinal to a life sentence for “political and other
crimes” in 1956, including his escape from custody and his carrying out “criminal
activity against the political order of the Hungarian People’s Republic”. It was
also noted that the cardinal’s asylum constituted a violation of international law
and US government regulations, as well as an attempt to interfere in Hungary’s
internal affairs. Mindszenty’s fate was a Hungarian matter, not “subject to
Hungarian–US talks”. Finally, the note made it clear that the government would
“pay more attention to [the] Mindszenty question in the future”.26 The legation
concluded that the Hungarians were happy with the situation, or at least less
uncomfortable than the US. They emphasized that their “guest” was not making
things any easier and should therefore be advised to seek the Pope’s “spiritual
leadership”.27
The Foreign Ministry saw no link between Hungary’s intransigence and the
poor state of its relations with the Americans. This was attributed to the “sharply
antisocialist stance of [American] leading circles”, due to which only slow
improvements could be expected. The resolution of the Hungarian question and
the normalization of ties were expected in the longer run.28 By this time, however,
there were debates in the higher echelons of the party about economic reform.
This would require financial and economic assistance from the US, but it was well
understood that Washington would not agree to expand economic ties until its
outstanding financial claims were settled. The balance would favor the
Americans. Even if Washington were to accept all Hungarian claims, including
frozen assets, the restitution of Hungarian commodities, and compensation for the
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property lost on the “Gold Train”, it would not match the amount owed by
Hungarians for war damage to US property and nationalizations of American
companies.29 Although the “Polish model” presented itself, the Foreign Ministry
counseled procrastination. Poland had agreed to a financial settlement with the
US using income derived from increased trade resulting from commercial
incentives and long-term loans. Romania had increased its trade with the US
threefold between 1956 and 1960 and agreed to settle US claims. The Hungarians
must have known that Romania had signed to pay only a fraction of the original
claims against it, and that Hungary could expect a similar deal. However, the
necessary pragmatism and political will seems to have been missing from
Budapest.30
Image in Foreign Policy
Foreign policy is formulated not according to some objectively existing reality in
the external world, but on the basis of images in the minds of the leaders of one
power or another. Eventually this dependence on perception would work in favor
of Kádár’s Hungary. Hungary came to be pictured as the most liberal state behind
the Iron Curtain, even though, to paraphrase the Nobel-prize-winning author Imre
Kertész, it was “so horrible we did not even notice it”. In an analysis of Eastern
European satellites prepared in 1959, the CIA noted that Hungary had been
consolidated to a considerable extent since 1956, and although the CIA. had been
grossly mistaken three years earlier, it predicted again that mass rebellion was
unlikely.31 Stability was discussed in a positive light, even though prior to 1956 it
would have been seen as an unwelcome development, and pro-American
sentiment was taken for granted. Senator Charles Vanik wrote that “penetration
might be made in this part of the Soviet-dominated world to preserve and keep
alive well-developed but silent affection for America. The hope for the restoration
of democracy in this part of the world will be strengthened as a result of individual
missions of American citizens visiting their relatives.”32 However, the second
secretary of the legation in Budapest warned American citizens travelling to
Hungary that tourism behind the Iron Curtain was different from a trip to Western
Europe. Tourists and people visiting family were to be aware that they were
coming to a “police state”, where, if they met with difficulties, they might end up
at the mercy of capricious bureaucrats.33
A correspondent for ABC television named George Bailey traveled across
Hungary in 1960 and claimed to have spoken with “hundreds of people”. His
overall impression was “depressing”; he found that people had lost faith and did
not wish to get into trouble. Most of the people with whom he had spoken were
initially suspicious, but after a while they tended to loosen up and begin
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condemning the Kádár regime and the country’s foreign occupation. He visited
the once-upscale holiday resort of Siófok on Lake Balaton, where he saw hotels
for workers so depressing that they evoked Orwell’s 1984. It seemed as if
everyone were wearing the same uniform and taking part in group activities like
building roads. Later in Tihany, Bailey met others more like the Hungarians who
lived in his memory – teachers, writers, and intellectuals who openly lambasted
the regime. In the agricultural town of Makó, Bailey found beautifully kept farm
animals and buildings, “but the cows were better groomed and happier than the
people”.
While Bailey saw the dreariness of life there, National Geographic deputy
director Francis Shor focused on Hungary’s standards of living. Shor randomly
selected ten families, and since there were two wage-earners in each, every one of
them was able to maintain “a tolerable standard of living”. Shortages of goods
were “annoying”, but nothing that would lead to “unrest”. He found housing
conditions poor, but thought that people tolerated it “philosophically”. Shor
found, “somewhat to his surprise” (one may wonder why he would find this
surprising), “a fairly substantial intellectual middle class – unhappy and by no
means enthusiastic about the regime, but tending to accept it for the present”. A
freelance writer, Lance Wiley, found evidence that standards of living were
higher than in Romania, and thus opined that the Hungarians “did win a partial
victory in 1956”. In contrast to Bailey, one legation officer found that the
middle-class way of life had not disappeared. Hungarians went on vacation to
“enjoy themselves”; only a few attended the almost compulsory lectures that had
become a part of what was called ’vacationing’ in other bloc countries. He found
“much greater resistance [in] the Hungarians to forced indoctrination” than in
other communist countries. When Feld visited the scenic resort of Tihany, he
thought it “still preserve[d] some of its upper bourgeois atmosphere”. The intense,
purposeful flow of motorized traffic to Lake Balaton evoked the “decadent”
pursuits of people in the free world.
The Wall Street Journal reported on manifestations of a “bourgeois lifestyle”
in Romania, where communists “could enjoy the merry-go-round of night
clubbing, sailing and opera recitals”. Later, the New York Times would celebrate
changes in Romania in a small press campaign. The US Legation in Budapest
reported in 1961 that the number of American visitors to Hungary had grown
significantly, and that many were surprised by the courteous treatment they
received from Hungarian authorities. A Christian Science Monitor correspondent
was pleasantly surprised by the significant changes that had taken place in
Hungary since 1956, but an American conductor of Hungarian descent, László
Halász, found a different reality in 1962. Halász had once thought that changes for
the better had occurred in Hungary, but two visits convinced him he had been
mistaken. “There is general fear, cultural stagnation and except in showcase
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Budapest, a serious food shortage.”34 Dissent notwithstanding, a narrative was
being constructed to improve the image of satellites in hopes of earning them
better treatment by the US. They were no longer depicted as mortal dangers to
American values, but as places that were assuming more human qualities. The
psychological barriers to accepting the communist regimes, and that Soviet
control of Eastern Europe was a more or less permanent phenomenon, were
falling.
Czechoslovakia was a favored spot in the 1960s. Many Americans found
reality there far more pleasant than the nightmarish image presented by
anticommunists. Journalists found it to be a prosperous country even by Western
standards, the only country where “Marx was right”, although some remarked that
Prague was just a showcase that hid a less happy truth. Even so, Czechoslovakia
was considered the most flourishing state behind the iron curtain.35 Prague had
begun to open up in the mid-’50s; Czechoslovakia’s renowned spas in Karlovy
Vary and Marianske Lazne were reopened in 1955. Six thousand Americans
visited the country in 1958, and the motivation for allowing them to do so was
twofold: an urgent need to earn hard currency and a desire to display the “human
face” of socialism.36 Hungary also seemed to be on its way to more prosperity. In
the view of the American legation in 1960, Kádár had “every reason” to be
satisfied with the performance of his economy. In spite of a claim in New York
Times – which would later champion the cause of “goulash communism” – there
was no shortage of food in Budapest.37 And despite its political pronouncements,
the Hungarian government was making cautious overtures to the West. There was
interest in increasing the number of visitors. American Express included Hungary
in one of its package tours: three nights in Budapest’s art nouveau Hotel Gellért,
or at the Royal, complete with sightseeing, wine-tasting and a night at the Opera.38
Such images evoked not communist drudgery but a more upscale and colorful
middle-class existence.
Hollywood was making a comeback behind the Iron Curtain, as well, though
not to the same extent in every country. In 1961, two American movies were
among the most popular motion pictures in Hungary. Cinderella averaged 339
moviegoers at 3800 (!) screenings, while Around the World in Eighty Days was
enjoyed by an average of 555 viewers per show. These numbers exceeded by a
large margin the averages for Hungarian (206) and Soviet (174) films. Hollywood
was equally popular in neighboring Czechoslovakia, where authorities considered
cinema a potential tool for political subversion and cultural penetration. The first
American film to be shown in Czechoslovakia in the communist period was
screened only in 1960, and US movies would seldom appear there after that,
although some were allowed into the Karlovy Vary film festival to raise its
international prestige.39 Thus in this regard, Hungarian practices were more
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liberal. In his study of “soft power”, Joseph Nye has pointed out that while
American films may make the US look attractive in some countries, they may
have the opposite effect elsewhere. Hollywood images could also attract one
segment of the population while repelling others.40 Thus showing American
movies behind the Iron Curtain was a double-edged sword. Some carried
messages critical of the United States and underscored communist propaganda.
So, on the basis of a “gentleman’s agreement”, an expert on motion pictures and
propaganda in the US Legation in Budapest, Turner Shelton, “censored” whatever
products the US movie industry intended to show behind the Iron Curtain. Disney
went so far as to negotiate with the Hungarian state film company Hungarofilm to
produce a movie in Hungary for distribution in the US. The State Department
disapproved, fearing unwanted publicity for Hungary.41
Washington imagined Eastern Europe as a pro-American region. This was a
dubious assessment, though, as there were no public opinion surveys to prove or
disprove the assertion. Other evidence was circumstantial and sometimes hard to
interpret. An attraction to American-made automobiles, for instance, does not
automatically signify approval of US foreign policy. State Department assess-
ments concluded that “the US in Eastern Europe can draw upon considerable
assets of goodwill … This fund of resources is perhaps unique throughout the
region and unmatched by any Western country.” America “has the most prestige
of any Western nation in Eastern Europe”, and therefore the American presence
there had to be increased.42 Hungarians had considered mostly pro-American ever
since World War II. Lacking reliable statistics, surveyors depended on meta-
communication and signs to measure American popularity, such as the reactions
of people on the street to an automobile flying a star-spangled banner.
In 1961, the chargé in Budapest perceived a drop in American popularity. He
noted that he never saw any signs of hostile sentiment; in fact, people were ready
to show their interest and friendship in many ways, including semi-hidden smiles,
waves, hearty welcomes, and even gestures of agitation. He attributed the
decreasing frequency of such friendly signs to the Berlin crisis and to Titov’s
space flight, which had showed that Soviet successes were real. This slide in
popularity was also a part of a healthy maturing process, as the image of America
as a romantic “white knight” shrank back to reality.43 In spite of the tensions, the
US Legation sought to maintain contact with the Hungarian intelligentsia. This
was not easy. Some, like the celebrated actress Éva Ruttkay and her spouse, for
instance, rejected an invitation to a party organized by a foreign national and
claimed that attendance “would not be wise”. Still, the influential poet and
translator István Vas did show up, and asserted that “the most exciting and most
productive contemporary theater existed in the United States”. The remarks of
another poet of national recognition, Ágnes Nemes Nagy, were more characteris-
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tic of the paucity of knowledge about American culture in Budapest. Nemes Nagy
had no idea that Ezra Pound had been born American, had never heard of Robert
Frost, and declared that “only the British produce good poetry in the English
language”.44
Amnesty under US Pressure
While tensions between the two superpowers were receding, the United Nations
became the scene of a dramatic confrontation between the Western bloc and the
East over censuring the Soviets and their now staunch allies in the Hungarian gov-
ernment. This would be American diplomats’ first real success behind the Iron
Curtain and would demonstrate the usefulness of diplomacy and the strength of
the United Nations in exerting pressure on tyrannical governments. While inter-
national interest in Hungary was waning, there was not a single outstanding issue
between Hungary and the US that was resolved. As long as there was no improve-
ment, the United States would not be able to exert any influence, thus American
diplomats in Budapest recommended a favorable response to Hungary’s overtures
on trade expansion and a readiness to drop the Hungarian question at the UN.45
While the diplomatic mission was closer to the real world in its day-to-day deal-
ings with the communist government and often closer to the truth in arguments
with the State Department, this time Washington’s harsher approach turned out to
be more productive. There was an impasse: the Hungarians were waiting for an
American initiative in a diplomatic game of patience. Only Zádor, the Hungarian
minister, took the initiative to find out the Americans’ conditions for reconcilia-
tion. He told the State Department that while Hungary stood ready for talks, the
government would not even consider any negotiations directed towards “chang-
ing Hungary’s social order or provid[ing] unilateral advantage to the opposing po-
litical forces in the current international situation”.46 In response, Livingstone
Merchant, the head of the State Department’s Office of East European Affairs,
confided that what mattered for Washington was not the domestic order of an in-
dividual country, but its relationship to the Soviet Union. Ceaupescu’s Romania
would go on to become the best example of this initially rather rigid, but later
more flexibly interpreted formula. In Hungary, there was no apparent sign of au-
tonomy from Moscow or even a domestic ideological thaw. International rela-
tions were still seen through the prism of Marxist ideology as a struggle between
the “forces of progress” and imperialism. The Hungarians’ “main question” was
whether the expansion of American imperialism could be halted.47
Referring to the spirit of Camp David and the imperative of reducing interna-
tional tensions, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov tried to con-
vince the 14th Assembly of the UN to drop the Hungarian question for good, but to
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no avail. At Cabot Lodge’s initiative, the world organization once again con-
demned the Soviet Union and the Hungarian regime for failing to implement UN
resolutions in Hungary.48 Budapest was thus forced to revert to diplomacy and the
politics of “small steps”, moving from easily resolved problems to more difficult
ones.49 They began negotiating economic issues such as animal health, hoping to
be allowed to sell meat in the US for the first time since the war.50 Their main pur-
pose was the “liquidation” of the Hungarian question.51 Hungarian leaders were
willing to make an offer on Mindszenty, but affirmed that no “compromise of
principle” would be made, and required that any formula take into account the
“prestige and sovereignty” of the Hungarian People’s Republic, a condition they
would take very seriously.
Budapest wanted to be viewed as an independent entity on the international
scene. The Political Committee, the country’s highest decision-making organ,
concluded that an offer for “normalization” should be made if the four-power
summit scheduled for May 1960 were successful. This initiative included an offer
to resolve the Mindszenty problem.52 The conditions set by the Politburo were
wholly unrealistic, betraying an ignorance of the possibilities for Hungarian (and
even Soviet) foreign policy. Up to that point, the Party had regarded an exchange
of ministers as the precondition of normalization talks; now it was meant to be a
“reward” for the Americans if they would stop “spying”, cease giving refuge to
the Cardinal, and terminate their economic embargo against the socialist bloc. It
was as though the Political Committee did not take its own initiative seriously.
The best solution for the Hungarians would have been house arrest for
Mindszenty, with the Catholic Primate’s release from the country dependent on
“international conditions”.53 That meant the US would have had to guarantee that
the cardinal would not publicize his political views, a condition that was not
unacceptable to the US.
The Hungarians seemed to forget that any solution would require the approval
of the Vatican and the cardinal himself. Budapest insisted that the Vatican remove
Mindszenty from his position as head of the Hungarian Catholic Church, thus the
affair grew into a quadratic equation the chief variable of which was an obstinate
individual who had made it his personal mission to combat communism.54 In the
meantime, the Political Committee hoped that the US would take the first step.
The Hungarian Foreign Ministry may have had a small degree of independence
from the country’s leadership: the minister in Washington seems to have acted
independently in using a Swiss mediator to inform the State Department that the
government in Budapest was willing to take into account whatever recommenda-
tions the US administration might make, or to make specific recommendations of
its own if it would contribute to a normalization of relations. The mediator, Joseph
Milleger, added that he and Zádor had discussed the possibility of releasing
Mindszenty to Switzerland. He also claimed that the Hungarian foreign minister
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was ready to approach the US minister in Budapest to discuss the Mindszenty
question, which was then considered the main impediment to a restoration of
relations. The State Department refused the Swiss mediator’s services,
questioning his authenticity, and affirmed that they would keep the Hungarian
question on the UN agenda in order to preserve the prestige of the UN and remind
the “free world” of the Soviet Union’s behavior in world politics.55 Hungarian
records contain no trace of this strange episode, thus it is hard to say what may
have motivated it. Given that it was the most sensitive issue in contemporary
Hungarian international relations, it could hardly have been the initiative of a
single diplomat. Perhaps it was a trial balloon meant to sound out the State
Department. This would indicate that an agreement was more important to
Hungary’s leaders than the transcripts of the Political Committee’s meetings
suggest.
The whole thing came to naught as an ill-timed U2 spy mission wrecked the
1960 summit.56 Thus, seemingly because of world politics, but more probably
because neither side was ready for substantial compromise, the Hungarians
dropped their grander schemes for normalization. The Foreign Ministry pointed
out that Soviet-American relations had deteriorated and that the US administra-
tion was not in a position to relax economic controls without congressional
approval.57 In 1961, Kádár went to the UN, setting foot in the US for the first – and
last – time in his life. On the way there, he enjoyed Khruschev’s company on the
oceanliner Baltica, playing cards and his favorite game, chess. In New York, he
asserted that Hungary was ready to discuss normalization, but he also attached a
warning: “if possible we would like to avoid severing diplomatic relations with
your country”.58 The American minister in Budapest commented that relations
between his government and Kádár’s “turncoat” regime had never shown any real
signs of change. The State Department’s short-term goal in 1961 was to encour-
age peaceful progress toward a larger measure of national independence and
internal freedom for Hungary. Full independence and the free choice of
government would remain aims to be achieved in the future; but as was noted
then, almost no progress had been made since 1956. US officials believed that
communist rule in Hungary rested on Soviet power, police terror, and the
suppression of civil rights, but given the tensions between the two countries,
American goals had to be modest. They would begin by letting go of the Hun-
garian Question and restoring the legation’s ability to function, thus increasing
American influence.59 It was added that though the Hungarian Question was
already losing currency, the worst was still to come. Despite the standoff, it was
thought that the “average non-official Hungarian” still respected the United
States.60
As the memory of 1956 faded, the Kennedy administration grew eager to
“engage” Eastern Europe. The State Department was anxious to get over 1956,
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instructing the US ambassador to the UN to drop the Hungarian Question as soon
as possible so that the US could make contact with the “Hungarian people”.61 This
coincided with a new Hungarian initiative: Foreign Minister Sík, probably
inspired by the forthcoming meetings between Kennedy and Khrushchev, wished
to make a “significant” overture to the Americans. He considered eliminating
travel restrictions, but since this was a security issue, he would need the consent of
the Ministry of the Interior.62 In the meantime, the head of the State Department’s
Office of Eastern European Affairs declared that the US would regard it very
favorably if the travel restrictions imposed on US official personnel were lifted,
and suggested such a move would be reciprocated. This, however, would not
involve the UN.63 Sík’s measure was rather radical by Eastern European
standards; similar restrictions applied to Americans all over the Soviet bloc. As
with any decision made by the Political Committee, the Soviet ambassador,
Dmitrii Ustinov, was consulted. He gave his blessing to Sík’s initiative, as did
Hungarian Minister of the Interior Biszku, and thus the diplomatic note
announcing the removal of travel restrictions was handed to the US legation.64
Although this move was not insignificant, it paled in comparison with the
freedoms Romania was seeking at that time. Gheorghiu-Dej had threatened
Moscow that Romania would leave the Comecon, and Khrushchev had rescinded
his plan for Comecon unification rather than work at cross purposes with
Romania’s economic policy.65
If the Hungarians thought that they could offer Mindszenty in exchange for a
UN mandate, they were in for a disappointment. On April 5th, 1961, the State De-
partment official in charge of Eastern Europe, Harold Vedeler, told Zádor that
there would be no normal relations until the Hungarian Question had reached a
“satisfactory” resolution.66 Given the ongoing reprisals in Hungary, this was of
crucial importance, both to the Hungarians and for America’s prestige as the
champion of victims of communism. By then, the affair had become a battle of
nerves. The President of the UN General Assembly, Frederick Boland, thought
that the US should refrain from raising the issue because the “Asian-African”
group that usually supported Western initiatives considered Hungary a “Cold
War” matter.67 The Soviets were throwing everything they had at jeopardizing the
work of the UN’s Special Committee on Hungary. Witnesses were intimidated
and the spiritus rector behind the investigation, the Danish diplomat Bang Jensen,
was found dead in Central Park. It was suspected that he was murdered by the
KGB.
The US ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, thought that the Hungarians
might have been ready for a troop withdrawal – Kádár had referred to it in a
speech – or for a political amnesty, but that it would not recognize UN authority.
On August 3rd, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard H. Davis read a note
to the interim Hungarian chargé, Károly Hackler, in which he expressed his
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“wish” that Hungary would release all political prisoners as part of a general am-
nesty during Boland’s planned trip to Hungary. Davis intimated that a positive re-
sponse would result in the Americans’ dropping the Hungarian Question.68 Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk wanted the Hungarians to know that they would be ex-
pected to take drastic measures to improve their situation and resolve the Hungar-
ian Question. Amnesty for those imprisoned for their roles in 1956 would contrib-
ute significantly.69 They worded their note in a way that did not suggest a setting
of conditions, but rather “sincere realistic proposals”. If Boland’s trip were suc-
cessful, Washington would drop the Hungarian Question, accept the mandate, and
begin bilateral talks.70 This time, it was the Americans who were mistaken in
thinking that the Hungarian government’s dire predicament would induce it to
seize opportunity to get out of its strangling international isolation.
In his report to the Foreign Ministry, Hackler qualified the American proposal
as an effort to interference. He reported the precise conditions without mentioning
the wording of the “sincere proposal”. Then a Hungarian News Agency reporter,
Dénes Polgár, told an American journalist of Hungarian descent, André Marton,
that the “opportunistic and incompetent” Hackler would not faithfully report what
the Americans said and that Budapest would be able to cite interference in its
domestic affairs. Marton reported these comments to the State Department,71 and
the following day US chargé Torbert repeated Rusk’s message to Sík. Regarding a
Soviet troop withdrawal, Sík referred to the Warsaw Pact and claimed that the
party leader would construe any proposal for amnesty as an attempt to interfere in
Hungary’s affairs.72 Boland’s visit was called off. The Hungarians claimed that it
was because the Americans had made “unacceptable demands” concerning
eventual Soviet troop withdrawal, liberalization of Hungarian travel abroad, and
amnesty for 1956-ers.73
Developments in world politics did not help. The standoff in Berlin and the
subsequent construction of the Berlin wall, along with Kennedy’s fiasco at the
Bay of Pigs, sharpened tensions between the two blocs. Washington put the
Hungarians on the spot with renewed energy, using it as a proxy to put pressure on
Moscow. When János Radványi, a former officer of the Hungarian political police
and the new Hungarian chargé, tried to convince Presidential Advisor Chester
Bowles that the general amnesty was Hungary’s own business, he was told that
“1956 was not an internal problem”.74 Assistant Secretary of State George Ball
called the Hungarian problem a “special affair” that involved the “basic principles
of the UN” and warned that it would return to its place on the UN agenda.75 Rusk
again affirmed that there would be no normalization of relations between the US
and Hungary without a satisfactory resolution of the Hungarian Question, which
above all meant amnesty for the 1956-ers. Only then would the US begin talks
about an exchange of ministers or the eventual elevation of diplomatic
representation to the embassy level.76 And still there was no sign of an accord.
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Deputy Foreign Minister Szarka complained of US intervention and efforts to
overthrow his government. When János Péter, an ordained bishop of the Re-
formed Church, replaced Sík as the new foreign minister, the US Legation in
Budapest noted that this did nothing to help relations between the two countries.77
At that point, however, Kádár signaled that his country was interested in making
progress. He declared that Hungary’s desire to settle bilateral relations was
motivated by the hope that it could catch up with the West.
At one diplomatic reception, Kádár approached an American diplomat for the
first time in his life. In this, as in many other respects, he would go through a
remarkable change. After showing genuine hostility to the United States, seem-
ingly in the Leninist belief that it represented the highest and most dangerous
phase of capitalist development – imperialism – by the middle of the 1970s, he
was eager to visit it. For now, he would strike a conciliatory note, explaining that
conflicts in the world were between states, not people. He preferred not to use the
word “enemy”, generally referring to the US as an “opponent”. To ease tensions,
he would joke that from a certain perspective he would not like to dissuade the
Americans from their armament programs because if they were to devote their
strength solely to economic expansion, Hungary would find it even harder to
catch up. His aims, the party leader explained, were to overcome the inflexibility
of his political system and to reach parity with Austria – a somewhat more realistic
objective than Khrushchev’s plan to overtake the US. He also explained his
rationale for peaceful coexistence: though he complained that the US would
overthrow his system in thirty minutes if it could, he admitted he would do the
same to America’s. It had to be recognized that neither eventuality was on the
horizon. Torbert interjected that the US had different notions of building inter-
state relations. Americans were interested in the independence and prosperity of
others; poverty and misery anywhere were a disadvantage to all. Kádár revealed
his motives in replying that the poor were a problem, a reason progress needed to
be made in Hungarian–US relations. They parted with an almost cordial
handshake.78 Kádár appeared cold and reticent, convinced that he occupied a top
spot on the list of America’s enemies,79 but Hungary’s Achilles heel had been
revealed: its economy.
The Revolution of 1956 had emerged as a symbol of the struggle for freedom
and against oppression. As the State Department’s communiqué on the fifth
anniversary put it, Hungarian patriots had fought courageously against uneven
odds for their freedom and independence, and the free world would not forget
their sacrifices. The communiqué emphasized virtues like self-sacrifice and
courage, and ideals like freedom and independence. To help promote its own
internal cohesion, 1956 was portrayed as a struggle to be emulated by Americans;
however, the president and the vice president both rejected invitations to an event
organized by the Hungarian Freedom Fighters’ Association to commemorate the
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uprising.80 There was no need to irk the Soviets, and revolution had since been
replaced by evolution as the ideal method for transforming Eastern Europe.
Kádár’s conversation with Torbert occasioned a shift in the attitudes of
Hungarian functionaries, many of whom were accustomed to changing their
masks as situations or party interests demanded. Szarka was behaving congenially
and broached the opening of a commercial office in New York. Although the
legation in Budapest would not reject the idea altogether, the State Department
would have none of it. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles instructed
Budapest not to enter into any “initiative” with the Hungarians, however minor.
He would allow them to discuss proposals to abolish the staff cap, travel restric-
tions, family unification, and work permits for the legation’s Hungarian
employees81 – all of which fell under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry.
Szarka also mentioned the negotiation of a cultural agreement, something that the
US and Romania were already discussing. Later, Washington would exert
considerable pressure to conclude such an agreement, but at this point the State
Department would reject Szarka’s offer. They claimed that the US did not usually
sign formal cultural agreements with foreign states and would negotiate cultural
exchanges only after relations were normalized.82 Peaceful engagement did not
yet include Hungary; the old policy of quarantine still seemed the preferable
option.
The legation in Budapest tried to get things moving by suggesting that the
regime was attempting to forge a better international image of itself and improve
relations, even if it was not yet ready to pay the price. Domestically, the regime’s
record was mixed. The regime was seen to be countering popular anti-Soviet and
anticommunist hostilities with a campaign against contrarianism, indifference
and apathy. At the same time, an anti-leftist trend and even an anti-Catholic
campaign seemed to have appeared in the party hierarchy. The government had
consolidated its stability and self-confidence, and though physical and psycholog-
ical inculcation had not increased loyalties in the army, resistance to the regime
was weak and sporadic.83
As a small sign of opening to the West, the Foreign Ministry appointed a new
desk officer responsible for the US, who was thought to be more knowledgable
and urbane, as well as intellectually faster than his predecessor. János Bartha also
had personal experience of the US and spoke better English, which created expec-
tations that he would improve the dialogue with the US. The appointment of a new
chargé d’affaires to Washington was also interpreted as a sign of progress. János
Radványi had served as the chief of the protocol section of the Foreign Ministry
and was thought to be enthusiastic and discreet. The legation in Budapest under-
stood that Radványi regarded his mission as a great personal opportunity and en-
tertained certain illusions about what he would be able to achieve.84 Later,
Radványi sought to discredit his predecessor as a hardliner, although he was told
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by State Department officials that despite the tensions between the two countries,
Zádor had shown a correct and friendly attitude.85 Radványi would eventually
create a scandal by becoming the first Iron-Curtain ambassador to defect, and
would then make a scholarly impact in debunking disingenuous Hungarian efforts
to mediate in the Vietnam War. However, the US foreign service did not know
about a dark chapter in the diplomat’s career, namely Radványi’s service as an of-
ficer in the feared Hungarian secret police, the ÁVH. The experience with
Radványi underlines the fact that the true identities of emissaries from dictator-
ships are unknowable.
Even before the new chargé’s arrival, the State Department made known that a
favorable resolution of the Hungarian question at the UN could be expected only
if domestic changes were to convince lawmakers and the US public that such a
concession could be justified. As an “effective argument”, the State Department
proposed an announcement that there was no one still in prison as a result of the
1956 revolution.86 Since a partial amnesty had already been announced in 1960,
this was not an impossible condition. There is no doubt that this condition, which
was later called a “recommendation”, would have infringed on Hungarian sover-
eignty if the country had been a sovereign state, but that was not the case. At the
UN, Deputy Foreign Minister Péter Mód accused Washington of linking normal-
ization with amnesty. The State Department claimed that Hackler misunderstood
what he was told: amnesty was not meant to be a precondition; that would have
amounted to interference in Hungary’s domestic affairs. In an effort to find an ac-
ceptable wording, Turner Shelton indicated that some kind of a theatrical gesture
would be required lest he dare utter the word amnesty. Radványi, who allegedly
received personal instructions from Kádár to repair US-Hungarian relations,87
thought that this formulation was acceptable and told Turner that his government
would consider any serious advice.88 However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs re-
jected Turner’s formula.89 As a result, Radványi backpedalled and adopted a hard-
line stance. He sought Foreign Minister Péter’s “professional advice” in interpret-
ing communications with the Americans. On April 26th, 1962, he asked the State
Department for new “suggestions” on ways to jumpstart bilateral relations, as this
was his mission in Washington. He was told that the Hungarian government
would be expected to make a gesture clearly demonstrating that the events of 1956
were permanently closed. It was added that amnesty for the participants of the up-
rising was not a precondition, merely a suggestion.90 Radványi reported this ex-
change to his superiors in Budapest, and to avoid any misunderstandings, he left
the word suggestion in the original English. Still smarting from the upbraiding he
had received from the foreign minister, he reversed his earlier stance and said that
there was nothing new in the American formula, which “amounted to an interven-
tion in our domestic affairs”.
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Radványi also volunteered his own appraisal of American politics. In the
1950s, Hungarians could not report on the US without including an expression of
moral outrage, and Radványi now took up this tradition in asserting that Washing-
ton was a “captive of its own propaganda”. “They permeate their own public
through and through with the poison of hatred and lies” and were hence “unable to
break out of the circle they created even out of self-interest”. At the same time, he
warned Budapest that the administration would not pick a fight with Congress or
with public opinion, and thus it could be years before the Hungarian Question
could be settled. He opined that even “within the Kennedy administration’s sub-
versive activities an American effort towards normalization can be discerned”.91
The Hungarians were still waiting to make a move,92 so the State Department took
the initiative. In a conversation with Dénes Polgár, a journalist with connections
to the state-security services, Vedeler reiterated that American diplomats had no
desire to set conditions, but also stressed that only an amnesty would reassure
Congress and the public. If the government decided to exculpate participants in
the events of 1956 at its own initiative, the Hungarian question would be resolved
and concerns like trade, cultural relations, and Mindszenty could be addressed to
their “mutual satisfaction”. Vedeler warned that normalization talks would begin
only if the Hungarian question was settled at the initiative of the US, not if it sank
into oblivion, or in any other way. The next step would have to be made by the
Hungarians.93
A few days later, in what the US chargé described as a generously executed
gesture, Kádár indicated that he was ready to make progress, though he failed to
mention any concrete steps. The Foreign Ministry signaled that Hungary would
be ready to explore any domestic measures that might improve the country’s posi-
tion at the UN and thereby satisfy American conditions for improved relations. It
was also added that “psychologically Hungary could not afford to sacrifice its
pride and self-esteem by [giving] in to pressure”. Zádor added that the Americans
were mistaken if they thought that the Soviets were still exerting a “decisive influ-
ence on the politics of its allies”.94 Hence, he suggested, the decision on amnesty
was in Hungarian hands. In contrast, Torbert thought that Hungarian independ-
ence from the Soviets was nominal at best. In an astute appraisal of the many
sources of Hungarian conduct, he argued that Kádár’s freedom of action was in-
significant given Hungarian nationalism, Stalinism, Soviet interests, the pragma-
tism of progress, internal liberalization, and the memory of the role the liberal in-
telligentsia had played in the 1956 rebellion. Kádár was a successful tightrope
walker: he made cosmetic changes, but held himself firmly in place.95
Budapest was eager to offer Mindszenty as part of the price of a general settle-
ment, but this intention did not mesh with the Cardinal’s wishes. When the Hun-
garian deputy prime minister, Gyula Kállai, announced at a press conference that
his government was ready to discuss the archbishop’s future, Mindszenty sent a
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message to Secretary of State Dean Rusk asking him to forward a letter to the
Holy See in which Mindszenty expressed his desire to stay at the legation, even if
he were allowed resume his ecclesiastical functions. His position was shared by
the papal nuncio in Washington, who had been assured that Mindszenty could
stay in the American mission since there was no realistic chance of an agree-
ment.96 The Holy See agreed on the grounds that Mindszenty was the Hungarian
nation’s spiritual leader. His presence in Hungary was desirable; his departure
could have a depressive effect on the people.97 In spite of all this, the Vatican was
not looking for a way out and did not oppose the Cardinal’s departure. In fact, the
papal state requested Hungarian government permission for Mindszenty to attend
the Holy Synod in October 1962, where it hoped he would stay and allow himself
to be sidelined. The US also made overtures in support of this solution.98 Budapest
concluded from all this that the Americans were trying to rid themselves of the af-
fair, and thus that the Hungarians were winning the diplomatic game that had been
dragging on for years. The Political Committee’s appraisal was that the Ameri-
cans were trying to dump the cardinal, and that their demands were therefore di-
minishing. Thus the “package” they put together was utter disconnected from re-
ality. It included a new condition for the Catholic Primate’s departure: the return
of the Crown of Saint Stephen. This “political concession for normalization”
would further require that Mindszenty stay in the Vatican and be stripped of his
ecclesiastical functions. Communist leaders thought they might even be doing the
Americans a favor, since the US “would be able to get rid of both Mindszenty and
the Hungarian Question”. The Hungarian Question was important from many per-
spectives: beside its “domestic significance”, it could have a “demoralizing effect
on the hostile circles of the Hungarian emigration”, and was also “significant from
the perspective of the Soviet government”.
In addition to a compromise on Mindszenty, the Political Committee was also
ready for a settlement “of the matters relating to 1956 [for the] foreseeable fu-
ture”. Their price, however, would be unrealistic: the resolution of the Hungarian
question, an exchange of ministers, and the return of the Crown.99 It was true that
Mindszenty’s refuge was causing problems. A Swedish publisher somehow
found out that the aged prelate was working on his memoirs and asked for them to
be smuggled out to Stockholm in an American diplomatic pouch. The Americans
rejected the idea, partly on the grounds that a diplomatic pouch could not be used
for such purposes, and because the “unusual and sensitive” nature of Mind-
szenty’s position would not allow him to use the building for ecclesiastical or po-
litical purposes.100 This does not mean that they were ready to throw him out.
Torbert appreciated “this gentleman’s freshness and spirit” and his interest in cur-
rent affairs, even though he was obstinate and spent most of his time reminding
people how far he was from being senile. After his inauguration, America’s first
Catholic president, John F. Kennedy, made a point of greeting Mindszenty, assur-
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ing him of his “full sympathy”, and making known that the US government would
grant him refuge as long as his personal security and freedom required it.101 Thus
the Hungarians misread the situation. On October 9 1962, Radványi declared
that Mindszenty would be released from Hungary if he were to plead for amnesty
in advance.102 The Vatican simultaneously suggested that the Arcbishop of Vi-
enna, Cardinal König, could pay Mindszenty a visit, but the State Department
turned the offer down on the grounds that Mindszenty’s predicament was too sen-
sitive.103
In the meantime, the Hungarian chargé launched exploratory discussions after
consulting with the Soviet ambassador, Anatolii Dobrynin. Relations between the
Soviet Embassy and the East European diplomatic missions in Washington were
close and extended to Soviet briefings on world affairs and intelligence activities.
Dobrynin agreed with both “the principle and the implementation”.104 Hungarian
émigrés had already protested in the belief that the administration had decided to
drop the Hungarian Question. The British also let it be known that they were eager
to discard the whole affair.105 In September, Hungary proposed discussing the
Mindszenty question in return for a preliminary American guarantee regarding
the Hungarian Question and the amnesty, so as to avoid any semblance of domes-
tic interference.106 Since it was becoming increasingly difficult to inscribe the is-
sue on the UN agenda, Bruno Kreisky sought to convince Rusk that the Hungari-
ans were more likely to take steps if there were no great external pressure on
them.107 UN envoy Stevenson fretted over the possibility of a Soviet diplomatic
victory and recommended other measures to avoid a loss of prestige.108
Radványi was told that if the Hungarian government were to carry out the am-
nesty as a public policy, the Americans’ first step would be to take care of the
Hungarian Question. As opposed to the Hungarian position, which tied the regu-
lation of all outstanding issues to the amnesty, Radványi indicated that trade, cul-
tural-exchange programs, and the exchange of chiefs of mission could be negoti-
ated after the amnesty was declared. He made no mention of the Crown. Shortly
thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Davis presented a “written docu-
ment” – emphatically not a diplomatic note – which spelled out the American
terms. In order to avoid the charge of domestic interference, the word amnesty was
replaced with formula expressing US hopes that the Hungarian government, at its
own initiative, would publicly release any persons still imprisoned for their roles
in the Revolution of 1956. If these hopes were satisfied, Washington would see to
it that Sir Leslie Munro’s Committee of Five, the group in charge of the Hungarian
Question, were terminated; that no more resolutions critical of Hungary would be
passed; and that Hungary’s UN mandate would at last be recognized. The US
would issue a declaration calling attention to the new circumstances in Hungary
and would affirm that the Hungarian Question no longer served the cause of prog-
ress. Thereafter, negotiations would begin on the restoration of normal relations.
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These would include lifting the travel restrictions imposed on official personnel,
as well as financial claims, family unification, cultural exchanges, and
Mindszenty. Davis presented the text of the official declaration to Radványi for
his personal use. At his government’s instruction, the Hungarian chargé showed
the document to Dobrinin, who voiced his “personal view” that if the Hungarians
had already decided on certain domestic policies, the Soviet Union “can only con-
cur”.109 The whole issue was uncomfortable for Moscow and it is evident that
Budapest was procrastinating rather than make a move against the wishes of the
Soviet leadership.
In the meantime, the Cuban missile crisis erupted. US–Soviet relations had
been troubled for some time, partly as a result of Khrushchev’s brinksmanship.
First, he had set out to alter the four-power status of West Berlin, threatening
to sign a separate peace with the GDR if his demands were not met. Then, suc-
cumbing to pressure from East German leaders, he moved to construct the Berlin
Wall, which would become the metaphor for Europe’s Cold War division. He
thereby stabilized the GDR – and the situation in Central Europe.110 But when the
German crisis had subsided, Krushchev’s efforts to alter the balance of power and
preserve Fidel Castro’s revolutionary regime led the Soviets to deploy nuclear
missiles in Cuba, and it was only the political prudence of President Kennedy that
saved the world from a nuclear catastrophe. The Cuban fiasco may have played an
important role in Khrushchev’s subsequent removal. Kádár later claimed at a
meeting with Averell Harriman in Budapest that Khrushchev, with whom he was
on excellent personal terms, had confided to him his plan to deploy missiles in
Cuba. He claimed to have tried to dissuade Khrushchev from carrying out the
scheme, but to no avail. It is hard to say whether his story was true or not. It defi-
nitely reveals that the Hungarian leader wanted to be seen as a realist who under-
stood international power. Normally, the Soviet allies in Eastern Europe would
not have been formally consulted or even told about Soviet intentions; most were
given limited information about the missile crisis, and only after the US had bro-
ken the news.
This diplomatic tug-of-war around the general amnesty made clear that the sat-
ellite states could defy the power that controlled them in matters relating to a third
power as long as that third power was an opponent of their hegemon. Even though
Dobrinin gave Budapest a green light for putting an end to the reprisals and ac-
cepting Washington’s conditions for a settlement, the Hungarians kept dragging
their feet. Radványi advised the Foreign Ministry that the amnesty would be equal
to surrendering all “our principles”, though he was obviously saying what he ex-
pected his superiors wanted to hear. Then Khrushchev told his counterpart in
Hungary that there was nothing wrong with accepting the American conditions.111
Shortly thereafter, the VIIIth Congress of the HSWP announced that 95 per cent of
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the people who had been “condemned for counter-revolutionary crimes” as a re-
sult of the events of 1956 had been released.
In late November, Harold Vedeler was negotiating with Foreign Ministry offi-
cials in Budapest when his hosts explained that it was hard for a small country like
Hungary to be seen as bending to external pressure. Vedeler, who was satisfied
with the Hungarian attitude, was reminded of Kádár’s statement that the Presiden-
tial Council would review the cases of the last 5 percent who were still incarcer-
ated.112 Deputy Foreign Minister Mód also hinted that his government was con-
sidering an amnesty,113 which was finally announced in April 1963. Washington
was still dissatisfied with the steps the Hungarians took to implement Davis’s con-
ditions and chose to employ a new strategy. Washington announced the termina-
tion of Sir Leslie Munro’s mission, which had been taking a lot of criticism. His
assignment was taken over by the General Secretary of the UN, though the US
continued to advocate the suspension of Hungary’s mandate. This recommenda-
tion hardly made it through the relevant committee – the Greek representative dis-
regarded the instructions of his government and voted against the Hungarian man-
date. The Hungarian mandate was eventually accepted at a special session of the
UN in May 1963. By then, the Hungarian Question was no longer on the agenda.
The Hungarian amnesty was the first American diplomatic success behind the
Iron Curtain since the satellite regimes had established. The UN turned out to be
an effective tool for putting strong pressure on Moscow and its client state, the
bloody, tyrannical regime of János Kádár. As the Hungarian Foreign Minister
would acknowledge, Hungary ended its campaign of reprisals as a result of
American pressure. There were important lessons to be learned. The diplomacy of
the client states was becoming more autonomous, making it possible to defy
Moscow’s will in questions of smaller importance. Hungarians did so, asserting
what they perceived to be their sovereignty. US diplomacy was thus forced to
reckon with national self-esteem, even though communists were not believed to
have such feelings.
Dilemmas of Bridge-Building
American observers noticed that the communist regimes in East Europe were be-
coming increasingly autonomous. They were beginning to assert that their na-
tional interests were not always identical with those of the Soviets. Signs that they
were heading toward more independence from Moscow made the European status
quo acceptable to the United States, if not necessarily desirable. Some went as far
as to argue that the Soviet occupation had produced an unprecedented stability in
a former cockpit of continental hostilities. Soviet hegemony thus seemed prefera-
ble to an unchecked flow of unbridled nationalism. And while nationalism might
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have been part of the antidote to unrestricted Soviet control, it had to be handled
with care.
The planned intensification of American trade and cultural contacts with East-
ern Europe proved difficult to implement. In the Johnson years, it was propaganda
rather than reality. As an exasperated Ceaupescu aptly put it, not a single pillar of
the bridge had been put in place. American analysts and policy-makers could not
agree whether to offer expanded cultural and commercial contacts as rewards for
better behavior, or whether the establishment of trade and cultural exchanges
would hasten a political liberalization. There were also security considerations.
The battle lines in Eastern Europe were still drawn as if it were the 1950s. The
State and Commerce Departments insisted on bridge-building as a way of trans-
forming the lands behind the Iron Curtain and diminishing European tensions.
Eastern Europe also offered new markets to the US economy. The Pentagon and
the Joint Chiefs, however, were still concerned about possible American contribu-
tions to Soviet military might and did their utmost to impede the implementation
of the administration’s trade new doctrine. Although these dilemmas would re-
main unresolved, the socialist states’ desire for American trade, loans, and techni-
cal know-how was increasing. However, due to a combination of interagency ri-
valries, Congressional resistance, domestic interest-group pressures, and sterile
debate about the merits of interaction with the communist world, the United States
missed a historical opportunity to transform the East European landscape and save
it decades of further devastation under dysfunctional dictators.
On the other hand, dealing with economically backward dictatorships was not
a simple matter. Anxious to preserve their power with minimal concessions, these
regimes used the increasing American willingness to negotiate as a means of
extracting favors. By and large, they remained ideologically hostile to the US,
which they suspected of trying to subvert them. There was also the Kremlin to
worry about, although the Soviets do not seem to have resented Eastern
Europeans’ closer ties with the Americans, as long as it suited their interests. Both
sides wanted scientific and academic exchanges, but with opposite purposes. The
Hungarian communist government wished to bolster itself by bringing modern
technology and scientific skill back to Hungary from the US, while minimizing
potentially subversive exchanges in the humanities. Washington, on the other
hand, hoped to use precisely this sort of cultural exchange as an element in its
policy of external transformation. Trade expansion was equally difficult. East
Europeans were unable to pay for the US goods they hoped to purchase and had
little with which to barter. Hungary hoped American credit would fund a
modernization of its economy, allowing it to produce goods worthy of global
marketing. The backwardness of the Hungarian economy made loans for badly
needed machinery risky, and trade restrictions like Cocom made things even
worse. Thus the policy of bridge-building was fraught with contradictions.
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The mood swings in Moscow over the Americans’ intentions also had to be
contended with. The Soviets were concerned about American intervention in vari-
ous parts of the globe, but perhaps their greatest concern was a NATO proposal to
pool nuclear weapons, which suggested to the Soviets that such devices would be
shared with the Germans. “What if another Hitler arose?” Prime Minister Kosygin
asked.114 Averting such scenarios was the primary focus of Soviet diplomacy.
And insofar as the Vietnam conflict hampered Soviet–American relations, it in
turn impeded Hungarian efforts to mend fences with Washington.
Towards a Modus Vivendi
A reorientation of US policy was necessitated by the fact that the French, the Ger-
mans, and the British were reappraising their relationships with the communist
bloc and trying to make them more constructive. British military leaders had con-
cluded that Soviet leaders were unlikely to risk the consequences of a third global
conflict.115 In question was the degree of independence with which the nations of
Eastern Europe could conduct themselves. Security remained the chief concern
and US officials continued to see Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe as a poten-
tial threat. Eastern European “vulnerability” could still be exploited, bearing in
mind the “realities of power”, namely Soviet preponderance in the region. At the
same time, Western influence behind the Iron Curtain needed to be increased, and
not by circumventing the local communist regimes, but rather with their consent.
In 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued for policies of peaceful engage-
ment, particularly in the cases of Poland and Romania, and even for Hungary,
which was commended for having moved toward a more liberal policy of “na-
tional reconciliation”. President Johnson used the term “bridge-building” to sig-
nify commercial, intellectual, and humanitarian exchanges with Eastern Europe,
including tourism.116 The earlier policy of “quarantining” Eastern Europe was la-
beled “passive, sterile, and defeatist”.117 The State Department supported Johnson
and encouraged an intensification of trade relations in the hope that Romania and
Hungary would be willing to go as far as Poland.
The practical implementation of bridge-building would take a long time to
catch up with the rhetoric. Romania began making strenuous efforts to purchase
US equipment for its oil refineries and synthetic-rubber factories in the final year
of the Kennedy administration, and though the project enjoyed the unqualified
backing of the US ambassador in Bucharest and (apparently) the president, the
purchase never went through. The Department of Commerce made it clear that
there would be no rapid expansion of trade relations with Romania because of
Cocom regulations and the fact that the American business community was not
ready. Despite Congressional resistance, Kennedy permitted the sale of US wheat
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to Eastern Europe; however, the AFL-CIO was able to insert a proviso requiring
that at least half the shipments sail under the US flag, effectively sabotaging
Kennedy’s concession. Congressional opposition was at least partly a response to
pressure from East European immigrants, many of whom considered opening the
American market to communists equivalent to a betrayal of the fatherland.
After his inauguration, Johnson decided that Romania would be the test case
for the new approach to East European trade. Up to that point, only Yugoslavia
and Poland had been allowed to sell to the US as most favored nations. The US
Chamber of Commerce was eager to follow up on the Johnson administration’s
pledge to intensify American economic interaction with the Soviet bloc.
East–West trade had been impeded by denials of MFN status, as well as the fact
that the Export-Import Bank had refused to extend commodity credit to countries
under communist leadership. US firms also faced difficulties in acquiring licenses
to market their products behind the Iron Curtain. These procedures were relaxed
only for Romania and Poland. Bucharest made a particular effort to get its
purchases licensed; it managed to secure permits for eleven plants’ worth of
equipment out of the fifteen for which it applied.
The importance of breaking into the untapped East European market was un-
derscored when Firestone announced the construction of a tire factory in Romania
and its competitor, Goodyear, immediately launched a counter-campaign. The
Johnson administration was divided on the issue. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara supported an unconditional intensifica-
tion of trade relations in the belief that commerce was important enough to the
communist regimes to force them into political concessions. Rusk and McNamara
approved of the sale of any commodity without direct military significance. In
contrast, the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture would restrict sales to
items that could be “drunk or eaten”, and only on a quid pro quo basis.118 In April
1965, the Miller committee, set up by the president to investigate the question of
trade with the Soviet bloc, presented its findings. Its report stated that US trade
policy should promote autonomy in Eastern Europe and that the Soviet bloc
should adopt the trade practices of the rest of the world. The committee recom-
mended relaxing US licensing procedures on a country-by-country basis and for
the president to be vested with the authority to extend a country’s MFN status for a
limited period. However, because of the Vietnam war, the committee’s recom-
mendations were never implemented. Bridge-building remained an empty doc-
trine. As Romanian party leader Ceaupescu complained to Johnson, “not a single
pillar” of this East–West bridge had been built.119
By 1964, the question was how far the United States wanted the satellites to go.
That year, the CIA’s Special National Intelligence Estimate asserted that Moscow
and the client states had established a new and less rigid relationship. This was
partly due to political changes and partly the result of the communist regimes’ re-
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alization that they could devote more attention to their own national interests.120
This statement suggests a misunderstanding of communist ideology common in
US appraisals. For most leaders of the communist persuasion, Soviet and national
interests were two sides of the same coin, inseparable. The CIA also asserted that
Eastern Europe was facing a significant transformation the central components of
which would be internal liberalization and economic reform. These problems
would be closely tied to the questions of autonomy and relations with the western
world. It was assumed that the Soviet bloc would become more diverse and that
some countries would move toward political liberalization and more efficient eco-
nomic principles. Leaders would approach these issues from the perspectives of
national interests and local political conditions. And if the satellites were more in-
dependent from Moscow and closer to the West, Soviet intervention was thought
to be less likely, a possibility only if “vital Soviet interests” were threatened. US
officials expected Moscow, absent challenges to its client-state arrangements or
defections from the Warsaw Pact, would be willing to tolerate a variety of the po-
litical systems and possibly even consent to manifestations of increased autonomy
in foreign affairs.121 Secretary of State Rusk instructed US missions in Eastern
Europe to refrain from the use of the term “satellite” in diplomatic correspon-
dence; in his view the term was no longer adequate to describe these countries’ re-
lations to the Soviet Union.122 Hence a new image of the Soviet zone was being
constructed so as to fit the new administration’s more activist doctrine. Yet this
new image was also calibrated to accommodate the continued existence of an
East–West divide.
Despite improvements, conditions behind the Iron Curtain were still far from
perfect. Communist economies remained inefficient and therefore produced mass
dissatisfaction, manifestations of which were expected.123 Declining living stan-
dards in Poland and Czechoslovakia led the State Department to predict that insta-
bility there would grow. On the other hand, Romania, which the New York Times
had called the most dynamically growing communist economy, and Hungary,
where Washington perceived continued improvement, seemed to be stable. The
best response to the threat of instability due to sluggish growth was an intensifica-
tion of economic relations.124 There were also security risks inherent in the So-
viet-dominated area. The communist governments were involved in a subversive
campaign to promote the world-wide victory of communism. Their activities in-
cluded military and financial aid to the communists of the “free world”, clandes-
tine shipments of arms, and training subversives in guerrilla action, intelligence,
propaganda, political oratory, and the indoctrination of youth. Czechoslovakia
and the GDR were considered the most active in these areas, followed by Bul-
garia. Poland, Romania, and Hungary seemed to limit their activities to intelli-
gence, clandestine broadcasts, and student training, which was “modest” in com-
parison with the former countries. US intelligence assumed that Hungary was col-
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lecting information on missile-launching sites and that there was close coopera-
tion between Soviet, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian intelligence agents.125 This
was still a traditional estimate in the sense that it appraised the Soviet bloc accord-
ing to the threats it posed to the West.
American officials also took a new approach in appraising the dangers of in-
creasing autonomy in Eastern Europe. This line of thought questioned the desir-
ability of eliminating Soviet hegemony. The CIA’s SNIE for 1964 assumed that
hostilities between East European countries and between Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union would come to the fore again soon. Frictions between Hungary and
Romania could already be detected.126 The Political Planning Council deemed the
division of Europe unacceptable because it put the United States in greater danger
of a nuclear war. Yet there were also dangers inherent in the restoration of inde-
pendence: “Unbridled nationalism in Eastern Europe might lead to possible re-
newal of the patterns of conflict that made the area such a cockpit prior to pax
communista. This potential is evident in complex of latent and potentially danger-
ous territorial and minority issues in the area.” This suggested that American
goals in the countries then under Soviet domination would have to be less ambi-
tious: “Continuing development of Western unity in close association with the US
to a further loosening (but not severing) of abnormally tight bonds between the
USSR and Eastern Europe, reduction in divisions between East and West” [em-
phasis mine]. In this formulation, American goals fell significantly short of a res-
toration of European unity. The juxtaposition of Western unity with a recognition
of the Soviets’ role further amplified the message that Europe’s division was no
longer seen as unnatural. Thus “reassociation” would not mean “political union or
military alliance”. The policy of bridge-building would serve to increase US in-
fluence and diminish the unnaturally high level of Soviet influence, thus enhanc-
ing European security.127 At this stage, no unanimous opinion had crystallized
around a long-term goal; statements to this effect were contradictory.
Publicly, Secretary of State Rusk defined the long-term American goal in East-
ern Europe as “evolution” toward the reestablishment of “national independ-
ence”. His immediate goals, though, were incremental: work toward independ-
ence, a diminution of the danger of war, and slowing the spread of communism.128
In contrast, a State Department memorandum prepared for the National Security
Council would go all the way: “We seek in Eastern Europe the establishment of
conditions under which the people of each country may determine its own society;
and where each country may enjoy national independence, security and normal
relationship[s] with all other countries. This will mean the final dismantling of the
Iron Curtain and the free association of Eastern Europe and the West.” Thus the
reevaluation of American goals was still in a state of flux. The State Department’s
ambitious program would link the solution of the German question to the resolu-
tion of the status of Eastern Europe and work towards the construction of a “last-
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ing” relationship with the Soviet Union. It recommended practical steps to break
out of the diplomatic deadlock, including the settlement of outstanding claims
with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, compromises on consular issues, and the lift-
ing of travel restrictions on diplomatic personnel. These latter two countries
would also be singled out for bilateral talks modeled on negotiations then under-
way with Romania and the Soviet Union. The elimination of discriminatory tariffs
was expected to shift the economic focus of Eastern Europe toward the West, thus
reducing its dependence on the USSR. Intellectual bridges would be constructed
through the dissemination of American scholarships, library collections, scien-
tific publications, cultural bulletins and films. American officials would encour-
age English-language instruction and the establishment of Chairs of American
studies. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania were identified as suit-
able countries for cultural exchanges because they acknowledged the importance
of American scientific and technological aid for the development of their econo-
mies. One official recommended a public-relations drive to convince people in the
Soviet bloc of America’s peaceful intentions. This was especially important in
light of ongoing NATO discussions of its plan to share nuclear arms with West
Germany,129 an idea that Soviet propagandists exploited, describing it as mali-
cious US support for German “revisionism”.
Washington was struggling to maintain the cohesion of the West at a time
when the Soviet threat seemed to be receding. In those circumstances, putting an
end to Europe’s division was no longer an unquestioned dogma of American for-
eign policy. In fact, this ideal was gradually being left behind. “Promotion of
Western cohesion is the primary objective. […] Ending the partition of Europe is
not necessarily the same thing as achieving a stable European settlement. The end
of division could come about through the fragmentation of both alliances, could
contribute to new conflicts and tensions, the end result could be the restoration of
a futile past, not shaping a constructive future.”130 Washington’s chief ally in
NATO, Great Britain, was also reevaluating its stance toward the Soviet Union
and its client states. In 1964, the British Foreign Office concluded that the com-
munist regimes were relying less on terror and coercion and more on improve-
ments in living conditions. For these trends to continue, East Europeans would
need to modernize their economies with Western capital and technology. Britain
could back reforms and détente by developing closer commercial, cultural, and
scientific contacts. Any weakening of the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe would
now come about through evolution rather than revolution. In the long run, trade
and cultural exchanges would help East Europeans gain greater autonomy from
the USSR. The British economy would also profit from this trade with the Soviet
bloc.131
Crucially, Hungarian émigré leaders supported the new American strategy.
Former Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy and the former Speaker of Parliament Béla
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Varga, both influential in émigré circles, claimed that their former countrymen
preferred a policy of peaceful liberalization to one of liberation.132 Their support
mattered: the organization of East European émigrés, the Assembly of Captive
Nations in Europe, had condemned the policy of bridge-building, branding trade
with the communists “immoral” because it meant importing goods produced by
“slave labor”.133 Talks aimed at putting this new doctrine into practice occasion-
ally degenerated into hostile exchanges. Americans and their communist counter-
parts were not always rowing in the same direction. One legacy of the 1950s was
that Congress exerted a strong influence on policies towards Eastern Europe, of-
ten opposing ties with communist regimes or insisting on strict preconditions. Fi-
nally, there was no meeting of minds within the successive American administra-
tions about the implementation of this new line. Hungary’s case was special in the
sense that there were numerous unsolved issues that did not burden relations with
other communist states. Hungarian leaders were open to an expansion of ties, but
set a hefty price in insisting on the return of Saint Stephen’s Crown. Progress re-
mained painfully slow, even though the situation in Hungary was improving and
the regime had managed to stabilize itself.134
The CIA concluded that Kádár had consolidated his power over the party while
“silently” pushing his country down a path of gradual change and pragmatic im-
provements in the political and economic climate. He even managed to turn Hun-
garian nationalism to his advantage and, at least according to CIA analysts, lost
the stigma of a Soviet puppet. This relatively liberal line was expected to con-
tinue.135 In 1963, the US chargé in Budapest suggested that year had been the best
for the average Hungarian since the communists had seized power.136 The histo-
rian János M. Rainer has observed that in Eastern Europe, connotations associated
with the ’60s “remain to this day decidedly positive”. It tends to be remembered as
a decade of thaw, of breathing more freely, of hopes and chances and greater liber-
ties than the previous decade had afforded. Despite political constraints, even the
decade’s cultural revolution managed to creep behind the Iron Curtain. Cam-
paigns of forced collectivization and industrialization, brutal reprisals and dis-
crimination against “class enemies” and “remnants of the old ruling classes”, and
protracted attacks on political opposition, lasted until roughly 1963. But then, the
profound economic reforms introduced from 1963–1967 led to a measure of intel-
lectual and cultural openness. Discrimination against social groups allegedly hos-
tile to socialism abated. Kádár was not a reformer by instinct. Caught between
Moscow and his own population, he ushered in reforms. These brought modest
prosperity, the beginnings of a new social stratification in a fragmented and lev-
eled society, some freedom of artistic self-expression, and more openness toward
the capitalist world than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc. The youth protested
mainstream socialist norms of behavior and tuned in to RFE to follow American
trends. Wearing outrageous clothing and hairstyles, they attended rock concerts
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where they tolerated cover versions of British and American originals. The fact
that the police could bring these youths in for parading around in smuggled, ille-
gally purchased apparel demonstrates the limits of Kádár’s little freedoms.137
Now that the Hungarians’ political amnesty had removed one of the chief hur-
dles to the normalization of their relations with the West, they introduced an eco-
nomic reform. It was clear that these reforms could not work without “opening” to
the West, thus their most important precondition was to bring ties with the US to a
normal footing. Given the Johnson administration’s decision to engage with the
communist regimes, the stage seemed to be set for rapid progress toward the de-
sired intensification of the American presence in Hungary. In February 1964, Bu-
dapest proposed bilateral talks for the mutually acceptable resolution of outstand-
ing issues.138 As expected, the main goals were the settlement of economic dis-
putes and the elimination of trade discrimination. The American legation sup-
ported the initiative, having heard rumors that Khrushchev was about to announce
the withdrawal of Soviet troops. This hope, along with the positive outlook on Bu-
dapest’s talks with the Vatican, gave rise to optimism that progress could be made
with Washington. The legation proposed that the two parties focus on Mind-
szenty, financial claims, and lifting the Hungarians’ restrictions on cultural activi-
ties and diplomatic personnel. American officials thought that the Hungarian gov-
ernment would try to link outstanding financial claims to the country’s MFN sta-
tus and would work for a cultural agreement in order to enhance Hungary’s pres-
tige.139 The Pentagon was optimistic that Soviet occupation forces would be
pulled out because they thought – for reasons left unexplained – that the Red
Army’s position on the central front would be enhanced if the four divisions sta-
tioned in Hungary were pulled back to Soviet territory.140 It was also assumed that
Romania’s overtures to the US would constrain Budapest to accelerate its normal-
ization process.141 None of these assumptions seem to have been correct.
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy recommended accepting the
Hungarian offer on the grounds that an increased US presence in Budapest prom-
ised substantial advantages. Hungary had gone further than any other satellite in
de-Stalinizing its communist system, and this trend was continuing. Bundy ex-
pected the American owners of nationalized property to be compensated, a con-
sular agreement to be signed, family unifications to be allowed, and commercial
and cultural ties to be broadened.142 In sum, talks would be opened because Hun-
gary had declared an amnesty and the Kádár regime was thought to be pursuing
policies of national appeasement, independence, and liberalization.143
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Bilateral Relations in the Mid-1960s
Theoretically, the conditions were ripe for a rapprochement. Both sides were mo-
tivated, but their positions were still widely divergent. The Hungarians were will-
ing to negotiate on Mindszenty and a consular agreement, but shunned a cultural
accord. As with all deals, the devil was in the details. Budapest was ready to settle
financial claims, but only after being granted MFN status, and had no desire to lift
its restrictions on diplomatic personnel or its ban on US information activities.144
The settlement of financial claims proved to be another stumbling block. Wash-
ington insisted on payments as a condition of further progress. Hungary’s trade
balance with the US was negative, and included long- and short-term debt, com-
pensation for nationalized property, the surplus-property loan, and compensation
owed for American property damaged in the war. Hungary had only 6 million dol-
lars’ worth of property frozen in the US. Most of the Hungarian property, esti-
mated at 100 million dollars, that had been taken into the American zone during
World War II was thought to be impossible to collect. This included obligations to
Jewish owners of valuables stolen from the “gold train”, some of which ended up
in the hands of American army personnel and some of which were auctioned
off.145 The US pointed out that the settlement of these claims would help Hungary
borrow on international financial markets, which was in fact Kádár’s main moti-
vation.146 Western loans were an indispensable ingredient in the country’s mod-
ernization and reform program. There was no breakthrough, even though Hungar-
ians understood that without normalizing relations with America, they would not
get the loans they needed. A chief factor in stalling these negotiations may have
been the Vietnam War, which froze relations for almost a decade.
Even though comprehensive talks started in Budapest in May 1964, no agree-
ment was reached on any of the most problematic questions. Secretary of State
Rusk offered to meet his counterpart, János Péter, to break the deadlock. The Po-
litical Committee authorized the foreign minister to tell Rusk that Mindszenty
could be released and taken out of the country if his “silence” was guaranteed. On
the other hand, the party leadership still insisted that the country’s MFN status be
the prerequisite for any settlement of financial claims.147 Rusk was not completely
opposed to MFN status, but it soon turned out that the differences could not be
bridged.148
Mindszenty was still intractable. Saddled with the cardinal’s upkeep, Wash-
ington was ready to accept the condition of “silencing” him politically. The prob-
lem was the Budapest–Vatican–Mindszenty triangle. Agostini Casaroli, the Vati-
can’s state secretary for foreign affairs, indicated that Mindszenty wanted to retain
his title as the Archbishop of Esztergom, i.e., the head of the Catholic Church in
Hungary, and acknowledged that it would be hard to keep Mindszenty from mak-
ing statements related to the Cold War. Mindszenty himself was reluctant to give
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up his refuge.149 His personal beliefs had become intertwined with high politics.
Mindszenty was convinced that his departure would constitute “negligence” to-
ward the loyal priests he had appointed.150 The communist leadership, evidently
for the sake of some positive publicity, wanted the cardinal to sue for clemency,
for that clemency to be granted by the Presidential Council (the country’s highest
legislative organ), and for the settlement to be published in the Hungarian press –
as Kádár put it, “even on page 11 in the sports section”. More importantly, they
would not hear of Mindszenty’s retaining his ecclesiastical functions, a condition
that would freeze the situation for years to come.151
Soon, Mindszenty’s tuberculosis recurred, lending urgency to his departure. In
September 1965, Radványi met Raymond Lisle, the State Department official re-
sponsible for Eastern European Affairs, to discuss the matter. The Hungarian left
with the impression that the Americans feared the cardinal might die on their pre-
mises and were therefore eager to rid themselves of the problem. He intimated to
Lisle that Budapest expected Washington or the Vatican to come up with a solu-
tion. Later that month, the Vatican’s state secretary responsible for Eastern Eu-
rope travelled to Budapest for talks with the State Ecclesiastical Office, the gov-
ernment organ that oversaw and controlled church affairs. Casaroli indicated that
there was no hurry because Mindszenty’s health was improving. Lisle told
Radványi that the Cardinal would not leave the building, and it was his impression
that Casaroli supported this position. Lisle also disclosed that the State Depart-
ment was putting pressure on the Vatican to persuade Mindszenty to leave.152
Shortly thereafter, the apostolic delegate in Washington told Lisle that the Vatican
was interested in the prelate’s departure but could not guarantee his political si-
lence, even though it would serve the Vatican’s interests. While claiming that
Mindszenty should not be allowed to set conditions, Lisle called his case a human-
itarian matter. Lisle was aware that the staff of the Foreign Ministry might have
been more enlightened and more interested in Western contacts than the State Ec-
clesiastical Office. He therefore wanted the Foreign Ministry to take over and deal
with Casaroli. He also indicated that the US would not take the initiative, but
would be willing to bring the parties together. Eventually Lisle was told that
Casaroli would be received on a “cabinet minister’s level”, but by then it was too
late: Mindszenty’s recovery removed the urgency of the matter.153
Considering that Budapest wanted to resolve its political issues before settling
financial claims – precisely the reverse of American hopes – no positive outcome
was in sight. The Hungarians referred to the settlement of financial claims as a
burden on the country even though, as in the Romanian and Polish settlements,
only a small fraction of its outstanding debt was to be paid; it was obvious that the
political will for such a step was missing. Washington would not make progress in
other areas until there was a deal on financial claims, but the stakes for Hungary
were far higher. The economy had been struggling with a balance-of-payments
50 LÁSZLÓ BORHI
deficit for some time, and by 1964, the year when the US–Hungarian talks started,
the proportion of short-term debt among Hungary’s obligations was worse than it
had been even in the 1930s. Half of the debt to the capitalist world was made up of
loans that were due in less than three months. Thus from the mid-’60s, Hungarian
leaders were forced to borrow medium-term loans in order to purchase capital
goods from the West. The idea that the US could serve as a source of financing for
investments was raised during the second and third five-year plans. American fi-
nancial markets were appealing because they offered dollars at less expensive
rates than the European markets. The option to issue bonds would not be available
to the Hungarian government until it settled its financial claims with the US;
membership in the World Bank and the IMF would also require American sup-
port.154 On paper, at least, an agreement was in the interests of both sides: Hun-
gary was in the process of discarding its inhibitions and using “capitalist” re-
sources to finance its economy, while Washington was interested in stabilizing
Eastern Europe and exerting more influence there.
Talks were held up by unforeseen events like the illness of the leader of the US
delegation and the accidental forwarding of the necessary documentation from
Washington to Bucharest. Again, though, the escalating conflict in Vietnam
destabilized the commercial pillar of the bridge the diplomats were building.
Americans feared that commodities they sold to Eastern Europe might be for-
warded to North Vietnam. In January 1966, President Johnson asked for congres-
sional authorization to use his presidential powers to sign trade agreements with
Eastern Europe in the name of bridge-building, but the bill did not make it through
the legislature. Instead, the Fino amendment barred the Export-Import Bank from
lending to countries that furnished economic or military aid to enemies of the
United States, including the Soviet Union and every other communist country ex-
cept Yugoslavia.155 For the time being, at least, Budapest would not be able to get
what it wanted, and the idea of talks began to lose their significance, even to the
Hungarians.
Soft Power
Penetration into Hungary was not an impossible task. The United States Informa-
tion Agency felt that Hungary was fertile ground for American cultural initiatives.
By the mid-1960s, Hungarian leaders were ready to loosen cultural controls in ex-
change for Western economic assistance. Their calculus was relatively simple.
Political stabilization would require some degree of popular contentment, and this
sense of satisfaction could be purchased with a hike in the standard of living. This,
in turn, would require the inflow of Western capital, “capitalist” consumer goods,
machinery, technology, and know-how. Thus, a normalization of relations with
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the US was indispensable, and if normalization were to require concessions such
as allowing Radio Free Europe to be freely received, Hungary would be pene-
trated with American popular culture. This threatened the ideological integrity of
the state, but because of the previously outlined political and economic pressures
facing the regime, it was left with little choice. Washington realized that gradual
cultural penetration might encourage a step-by-step liberalization, from domestic
reforms to an eventual opening up to the outside world.156 There is no doubt that
the members of the Political Committee also understood this dynamic.
Poland was the main target for American cultural initiatives. Positive develop-
ments in Poland led the USIA to an ambitious plan for a library and cultural center
in Warsaw. In 1959, Poland signed an agreement for an academic exchange in-
volving 1000 applicants, while Czechoslovakia sent 100 and Hungary only 19.157
Private foundations also helped build East–West contacts. The Ford Foundation
cooperated with the State Department in establishing cultural ties with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, especially their intellectual elites.158 The Ford Foundation
and the Kulturális Kapcsolatok Intézete (Institute of Cultural Relations), the
agency responsible for external cultural contacts – also a clandestine subsidiary of
the security apparatus – established an exchange program in 1964 whereby Hun-
garian artists, scholars, and scientists would be able to visit the United States.
The selection procedure for this program illustrates some of the complexities
of creating ties with ideological regimes. The list of candidates was carefully se-
lected and vetted on the basis of professional and “political” criteria, meaning that
they were screened for reliability by the Institute of Cultural Relations and its
close affiliates at the Ministry of Interior. The Ford Foundation was then allowed
to invite a short list of 25 people, plus five “outstanding cultural and scientific per-
sonalities”, on an annual basis. No more than half of those selected were to be rep-
resentatives of the social sciences. In theory, at least, the Ford Foundation could
also nominate its own candidates, but these nominees would not appear on the list
of applicants without the prior approval of the Institute of Cultural Relations.
Ford’s short list was then forwarded to an organ called the Tudományos és
Felsõoktatási Tanács (Council of Science and Higher Education), which vetted it
from the perspective of the “interest of the people’s economy”. And this was only
the beginning of the convoluted process. Once approved by the Council, the list
was then sent to the Ministry of the Interior and the Scientific and Cultural Depart-
ment of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party for further win-
nowing. Finally, the presidium of the Institute of Cultural Relations, with the par-
ticipation of deputy portfolio ministers and representatives of the party leader-
ship, drew up a final list. It was only then that the Ford Foundation received the
final list of candidates.159
Washington pushed hard to open American libraries in Iron-Curtain capitals
and entertained high hopes for the transformative effects thereof. But these
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calculations disregarded the fact that Hungarian state-security agents (as well as
those of other bloc countries) would monitor visitors to US libraries, registering
each individual in a file at the Ministry of Interior. Visitors could then be
blackmailed into rendering services for state security organs. There is no doubt
that the Hungarian librarian of the USIA facility in Budapest was recruited by
state-security agents. Even as late as 1981, freshmen majoring in English were
warned that using the American library entailed personal risks.
The Hungarians did make a momentous concession soon after the Hungarian
question was resolved: they stopped jamming Radio Free Europe. The regime os-
tensibly did so to induce the station to alter its radical stances, but the more funda-
mental cause was probably the expectation that it would lead to US concessions
on trade issues. Accidents do play a role in shaping history, however. The party
authorized a decision to stop jamming on a provisional basis, but in a fateful mis-
understanding, the Foreign Ministry announced it as a permanent measure. Al-
though the Politburo was furious, the decision could not be repealed without risk-
ing a loss of face, and was thus grudgingly left in place. The Political Committee
also made a highly debated decision to allow the United States to participate in
Budapest’s 1965 International Trade Fair. This was an important breakthrough
for American champions of external transformation, who sought to instill Ameri-
can values in the communist states and to effect the gradual democratization of
closed political systems by sending goods and intellectual products behind the
Iron Curtain. Participation in the Budapest International Fair was an important
beachhead for this economic and cultural penetration.160
Budapest was not unaware of American successes in this field, and party lead-
ers were alarmed by the popular appeal of US “propaganda”. In 1965, the Political
Committee devoted several sessions to the evergreen topic of imperialist subver-
sion. Prime Minister Jenõ Fock, a leading economic reformer, contradicted those
who said “imperialist propaganda in Hungary is unable to undermine the masses’
confidence in the socialist system and diminish the attraction of socialist ideas”;
this was “not true, it is capable of doing so and is diminishing it”.161 The party’s
leadership thought that the United States and the FRG were “trying to pit the so-
cialist countries against the Soviet Union and each other, to subvert the socialist
system, to nurture dissatisfaction towards the party and the government, ulti-
mately against the social order and thus to prepare the restoration of capitalism in
the socialist countries. They are trying to achieve all this with the wide[-]range use
of foreign policy, economic[,] cultural[,] and personal contacts[,] as well as pow-
erful anticommunist propaganda.” They asserted that “subversive attempts
mainly manifested themselves in the differentiated treatment of socialist coun-
tries”, namely that some states got better treatment than others. Hostile intent was
attributed to scientific and cultural contacts, which Party leaders warned would
“open the door for bourgeois ideology and its products under the pretext of peace-
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ful coexistence”. All this had alarming consequences for the future of socialism:
“subversive propaganda plays a role in the sense that in the ranks of the public and
particularly in certain circles of the youth and the intelligentsia there is an intensi-
fication of love of the West and of nationalism which is coupled with the
downplaying of the results of socialism”.162
What could be done in such a situation? Kádár was not in a position to go back
to the isolation of the Stalinist years; the policy of opening up to the West was
slowly gaining momentum. The only antidote seemed to be competition with this
Western penetration. Gyula Kállai conceded that “the youth is not interested in or
asking for the full exposition of Marxism but the satisfaction of their needs and
adequate propaganda work in the meantime”. He insisted that Hungarian propa-
ganda continue to point out “the swinishness of imperialism”, but this would obvi-
ously not be enough. Politburo member Lajos Méhes called attention to two strat-
egies, one of which was surprising given the communists’ officially antinational
stance: he wanted the party’s “agitation and propaganda to do an even better job of
referring to our national sentiments and national self-esteem”. Méhes also wanted
to improve the quality of Hungarian popular-music programming to offset the at-
traction of American musical broadcasts like Teenager Party. This was precisely
what Washington wanted: the national idea, and westernizing popular culture,
both produced by the communist governments themselves. The only thing better
than Iron-Curtain youths’ listening to Top of the Pops on RFE would be their tun-
ing into domestic programming for the same sounds. At that time, Soviet pro-
gramming still followed Voice of America’s popular show Music USA, which had
been aired for Soviet audiences since 1955.163
One Hungarian refugee recounted that he and a fellow student had listened to
music on RFE in their university club every night. Indeed, rock music, including
the Hungarians’ domestic version of it, may have played a critical role in the for-
mation of a quasi-autonomous public sphere. In optimistic accounts, it helped dis-
mantle the party- state’s legitimacy.164 There is little doubt that Hungarian youth
used popular musical forms as a first line of resistance to communist indoctrina-
tion. In addition, music enhanced the appeal of the US at a time when communist
propagandists were trying to destroy America’s image with accusations of mur-
derous imperialism. The appeal of popular music put pressure on the authorities
who were no longer able to cut off the ample supply of Western radio program-
ming. Moreover, as Anna Szemere has written, rock music emerged as a lucrative
business, and “as such, highlighted and exacerbated the tensions between socialist
values and policies and the profit-orientation of the state-run entertainment indus-
try.”165
Everyday life had overtaken the decision-makers. Kállai complained that if the
party’s youth magazine, Magyar Ifjúság, was still “a communist journal, I do not
understand what communism means”. He noted bitterly that the paper was “popu-
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larizing Western lifestyle without [any] critique [of] the West... We do not find a
single socialist hero in it except the Beatles”.166 In fact, this publication’s cover
regularly featured young girls in bikinis exhorting the youth to sign up for the
communists’ summer-work camps under the slogan “Proletarians of the World,
Unite”.
Károly Kiss, the hardliner who served as deputy president of the Presidential
Council, a select organ of the communist parliament, was openly pushing for an
exchange of ministers with the United States, which the Americans interpreted as
a sign of important change.167 In 1965, Kádár declared that he was “willing to
travel anytime and anywhere” to mend fences. Although he was hoping to limit
his anti-imperialist protests to the area of ideology, the Vietnam conflict was as-
suming the dimensions of an East–West conflict and impeding progress in bilat-
eral relations. In suspending the normalization process, the Political Committee
pointed out that its “main reason” for doing so was “the American aggression in
Vietnam and its effect on the international situation”.168 The Foreign Ministry
pointed out that “because of the situation created by the Vietnamese policy of the
United States[,] we must forego the restoration of normal relations for a while”.169
Thus a geographically unrelated crisis in a remote corner of the globe would alter
the course of the Cold War in Europe. Had Kádár been able to achieve this open-
ing to the West in the early 1960s rather than a decade later, the collapse of Hun-
garian communism would very likely have come sooner, possibly pulling the en-
tire Soviet bloc into crisis.
The US Legation mistakenly believed that the Hungarians were using the Viet-
nam conflict as an excuse and had actually cancelled the normalization talks as a
way of finding out how much the US would be willing to “pay” for an agree-
ment.170 At the same time, the legation informed the State Department that Buda-
pest made the war in Vietnam a key factor in their bilateral relations, pointing out
that the tone and magnitude of the communists’ propaganda could hardly be rec-
onciled with Hungary’s stated intention to normalize relations.171 The Political
Committee discussed the possibility of Hungarian government ministers’ avoid-
ing the American exhibition at the Budapest International Trade Fair and using
the fair’s opening statement to “condemn the aggression[s] in Vietnam and the
Dominican Republic”.172
While some party conservatives might have thought that the time had come to
nip the western initative in the bud, reformers tried to block a reversion to isola-
tionism. A key figure behind the drive to liberalize, Jenõ Fock thought that finan-
cial talks should be pursued based on economic criteria. Interestingly, another re-
form-oriented functionary, Rezsõ Nyers, wanted to suspend the talks. Kádár came
out in support of resuming the talks while simultaneously making “political at-
tacks” on the Americans. He also disagreed with the idea of recalling Hungarians
from scholarship programs in the US, and with the motion that prominent recipi-
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ents of new awards, like the ethnographer Gyula Ortutay, cancel their invitations.
Kádár also rejected the idea that the world-renowned composer and musical
pedagogist Zoltán Kodály use his upcoming visit to the US to lodge protests. Al-
though he had no formal training in foreign-policy matters, Kádár’s views were
pronounced, and he usually prevailed. He held that in spite of the Vietnam war, re-
lations with the US should be settled. He added that in order to do so, the allies
(meaning the USSR) would have to be consulted.173 Kádár saw no reason to dis-
criminate against American exhibitors or use the fair as a forum for anti-American
propaganda. He asked rhetorically, ”Who should go and when to the American
exhibit? I have been working for years to take out the strong politics [from such
matters] because it doesn’t help us. The Hungarian soul likes the pen knife and
goulash but doesn’t like cutting rations.”174
American participation in the fair was a double-edged sword for party propa-
gandists. On the one hand, it trumpeted the regime’s newfangled policy of toler-
ance. On the other hand, it underscored the popularity of the United States. Inter-
nal surveys conducted a few years later revealed that one million people (ten per-
cent of Hungary’s population) visited the American exhibition each year. The lux-
ury items exhibited there fed the perception that “America is the home of unlim-
ited possibilities where one can make a quick fortune”.175 The American legation
in Budapest understood the regime’s dilemma: the great success of the exhibition
was proven by the “enthusiastic reaction” of the people, which suggested that
their government had failed to persuade them to condemn the United States. As it
basked in the glory of a successful fair, the government seemed likely to enhance
its own popularity by opening its gates even wider to American cultural influ-
ences.176
There were many signs of the appeal of American soft power. “American ma-
chines and know-how made a positive impact”; 200 “enthusiastic students” had
shown up at a movie screening organized by the American legation.177 American
literature, theater, music, architecture, and technological and scientific feats were
all well received. According to American reports, Hungarians read, watched, and
listened to a wide variety of American novels and plays with unusual enthusiasm.
American performers played in front of full houses, making it almost impossible
to get tickets to see them. Sometimes these guest performances went sour: the
Hungarians were fully in charge of invitations, thus many times “unknown” per-
formers would represent American culture very poorly.178
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